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In the mid twentieth century, New Haven underwent major transformations that continue to 
reverberate today. Highway construction aimed to entice businesses to the city and better 
connect cities with burgeoning suburbs; redevelopment officials hoped that urban renewal 
would be an opportunity to revitalize downtown areas and rid them of their so-called “slums.” 
A leader in the urban renewal movement, New Haven received more money per capita than any 
other city in the United States1, and under the leadership of Mayor Richard Lee, New Haven 
strove to become a model city for reformers across the nation. In time, urban renewal would 
become widely criticized; administrative technocrats were blamed for destroying entire 
neighborhoods in the service of ambitious plans that failed to work as expected, and Lee’s 
Redevelopment Agency was widely criticized for its failure to offer avenues for meaningful 
community participation, particularly that of the black community.  
 
Within this context, Wooster Square is frequently held out as a success story – the one renewal 
project that did involve residents and help turn around a struggling area, making it one of the 
most desirable neighborhoods in the city. Yet more people were displaced from the Wooster 
Square in the fifties and sixties than from any other neighborhood in New Haven. As in other 
areas, hundreds of buildings were destroyed, and thousands of people were displaced. In light of 
these realities, why has Wooster Square been spared much of the criticism to which other urban 
renewal projects have been subject? 
 
                                                     
1 Fred Powledge, 163, MODEL CITY: A TEST OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM - ONE TOWN'S EFFORTS TO REBUILD 
ITSELF. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970. 
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In this paper, I identify three main reasons that mid-century redevelopment in Wooster Square 
is widely perceived as a successful urban renewal initiative. First, urban renewal efforts in 
Wooster Square engaged many middle- and lower-income homeowners, providing them with 
numerous resources and with an important rung on the ladder of social progress. The 
collaboration between the city and residents on the western side of the square began during the 
planning of what would become Interstate 91, and continue throughout the urban renewal 
period. Because the interests of these residents aligned with those of the Redevelopment 
Agency (RA), close collaborations formed easily, lending credence to the assertions that the RA 
was responsive to the desires of local residents even as poorer Italians, black people, and others 
who gave the neighborhood its unsavory reputation were left out. Second, residents who were 
displaced by the highways and by urban renewal efforts were generally poor and frequently 
rendered invisible by the process of their displacement. Whether they fled in advance of the 
next big change, were relocated to other poor areas or, in the case of the lucky ones, found 
preferable living situations elsewhere, those who left the neighborhood were no longer as able 
to share the other side of the story. As a result, those who remained in Wooster Square or 
moved to it as a result of its gentrification were primarily responsible for telling the story of 
the neighborhood’s success. Finally, the RA made a concerted effort to make its successes in 
Wooster Square known, and the narratives put forward by supporters of urban renewal rarely 
included meaningful discussion of those who were pushed out of the neighborhood. The mass 
media, captivated by the story of a bad neighborhood that had made good, focused 
overwhelmingly on the poor quality of the housing pre-renewal, the involvement of local 
people in the planning and implementation of renewal projects in the area, and the beautiful 
architecture in the neighborhood. These treatments cemented a popular image of Wooster 
Square as the success story of the urban renewal period, even though it involved significant 
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displacement and disempowerment. Rather than an unmitigated success that avoided all of the 
missteps that befell other urban renewal projects in New Haven, urban renewal in Wooster 
Square is more properly understood as a complicated contest for the neighborhood’s future, the 
story of which would be told by its winners. 
 
II. FROM GRAND TO WORKING CLASS: WOOSTER SQUARE’S FIRST CENTURY 
 
The area that would come to be known as Wooster Square was first settled by wealthy Yankees 
in the early 1800s.2 A short distance from New Haven’s harbor, the neighborhood – then called 
the New Township – provided convenient access to the city’s commercial ports. The 
landowners around Wooster Square were men of high standing, and they built many of the 
Victorian mansions3 for which the neighborhood is known today. By the mid 19th century, 
Wooster Square had become one of the most fashionable areas in town.4 But the 
neighborhood’s splendor was destined to be short-lived. As the Civil War approached, New 
Haven’s rail-based economy became increasingly important, wealthy industrialists flocked to 
the area, and the number of factories continued to grow.5 Soon, “lifestyle wasn’t grand 
anymore.”6 Growing numbers of immigrants made their way to New Haven, and in Wooster 
Square, the Yankees were replaced by incoming Irish, German, Swedish and Italian 
immigrants. Wooster Square became ever-more attractive to factory workers, and ever-less 
                                                     
2 Mary Hommann, 21. WOOSTER SQUARE DESIGN: A REPORT ON THE BACKGROUND, EXPERIENCE AND DESIGN 
PROCEDURES IN REDEVELOPMENT AND REHABILITATION IN AN URBAN RENEWAL PROJECT. New Haven: The 
New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 1965. 
3 Gabrielle Brainard, 5. Party Walls: Understanding Urban Change Through a Block of New Haven Row Houses, 1870-
1979, JOURNAL OF THE NEW HAVEN COLONY HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Fall 2001. 
4 Powledge, 39. 
5 Brainard, 5. 
6 Lois Sabatino, A Neighborhood That Wouldn’t Give Up: Hey Hartford! Take a Look at Wooster Square, HARTFORD 
COURANT, September 29, 1974. 
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attractive to their employers, most of whom abandoned the neighborhood by 1900.7 The area 
became solidly working-class, and by 1920, the Court Street row houses – initially designed as 
single-family homes for small businessmen, managers and other members of the growing 
middle class8 – had become rooming houses for working-class immigrants. 9 
 
Although Wooster Square initially attracted immigrants of a variety of nationalities, Italians 
steadily gained ground in the neighborhood. Uneducated peasants in Italy, Italian immigrants 
were initially confined to working in the least skilled, least profitable positions,10 and living in 
the poorest areas in the city. Nonetheless, they made a vibrant life for themselves in Wooster 
Square. Comprising nearly a quarter of the neighborhood’s population by the turn of the 
century,11 Italians and Italian-Americans represented more than half of the area’s residents by 
1908. By 1920, such families comprised fully a quarter of the city’s population,12 and by 1930, 
they were over 80% of the population of Wooster Square.13 Often called Little Naples or Little 
Italy, the neighborhood was an Italian stronghold, and in many ways a world unto its own. As 
one former resident reminisced, “Italian was not a second language: it was the first language … 
children spoke Italian at home and English to survive in school.” 14 Remarkably, by 1930, “fully 
fifty years after the immigration from Italy had begun in earnest, there were still eighty Italian 
ethnic societies in New Haven … [and] there were innumerable social clubs for young men 
                                                     
7 Brainard, 5. 
8 Id., 7.  
9 Id., 9. 
10 Jerome K. Myers, Assimilation to the Ecological and Social Systems of A Community, 15 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL 
REVIEW, 367, 371-72 (June 1950). 
11 Powledge, 39. 
12 Stephen Lassonde, 20. LEARNING TO FORGET : SCHOOLING AND FAMILY LIFE IN NEW HAVEN'S WORKING 
CLASS, 1870-1940. Yale University Press, 2005. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost). Web. 4 Apr. 2013. 
13 Id. 
14 Bill Ryan, Neighborhood Has Flavor of Italy: Connecticut Crossroads, THE HARTFORD COURANT, November 24, 
1985. 
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that facilitated a larger sense of belonging to culturally distinct ways of life.” 15 Bakeries, pastry 
shops and meat markets catered to local tastes and cultural preferences. Babies were born at 
home, and the elderly often died at home, surrounded by family. The local community bank 
frequently “made personal loans based on family name and a handshake.”16 Residents rarely 
needed to leave the neighborhood, instead working at factories within easy walking distance of 
their homes and leaving “their apartment windows open where the sounds of Italian music and 
delicious aromas from their kitchens drifted down to the street below.”17  
 
A hotbed of manufacturing for decades, Wooster Square was hit hard by the Great Depression 
and various economic, social and policy trends that tore at the fabric of the vibrant 
neighborhood. When the economy soured, many factories struggled and eventually closed, 
leaving many Wooster Square residents unemployed and casting the neighborhood – the city’s 
most densely populated18 – into greater poverty. By the early 1930s, seventy percent of families 
in the area earned less than $1000, compared to forty percent of families citywide.19 The 
growing popularity of cars pulled more middle- and upper-class city dwellers to the suburbs 
and further undermined the significance of the city as a site for industry.20 The Depression 
caused housing prices to fall dramatically, placing them within reach of Italian-Americans who 
could buy them for cash and “putting most of the [area’s] property in the hands of the Italian 
community.”21 At the same time, federal housing policies designed to stem the tide of mortgage 
defaults labeled Wooster Square and similar neighborhoods as mortgage risks, severely 
                                                     
15 Lassonde, 21. 
16 Anthony V. Riccio, 350. THE ITALIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN NEW HAVEN. Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2006. 
17 Riccio, 349. 
18 Lassonde, 20. 
19 Id., 21 (citing John B. Whitelaw, 118-19, The Administration of the Elementary School as the Coordinating Social 
Factor in the Community (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1935)) 
20 Brainard,12. 
21 Hommann,  WOOSTER SQUARE DESIGN, 17. 
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limiting access to capital in these areas. By the early 1930s, the median value of homes in 
Wooster Square was three thousand dollars below the city median of $11,000.22 When 
appraisers from the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation descended on greater New Haven in 
1937, Wooster Square became one of almost fifty neighborhoods identified as a credit risk,23 
and it received the lowest possible rating: a D.24 D-rated neighborhoods were those 
"characterized by detrimental influences in pronounced degree, undesirable population or an 
infiltration of it” where “low percentage of home ownership, very poor maintenance and often 
vandalism prevail.” 25 The HOLC’s evaluation scheme included a number of considerations – 
including social status, homogeneity, and single-use development26 – that doomed ethnically 
mixed, working-class places like Wooster Square to low evaluations. Wooster Square’s mix of 
residential, industrial and retail uses, long accepted as a means of ensuring that workers would 
be near both to their jobs and to stores that could meet their day-to-day needs, was seen as 
detrimental.27 Immigrant laborers who had supported New Haven’s manufacturing economy in 
its boom time were stigmatized in its bust as “undesirable.” With few resources available to 
maintain or restore homes in the neighborhood, Wooster Square continued to deteriorate. Even 
World War II failed to revive Wooster Square’s flagging industrial economy, and by the 1950s, 
the area was one of the poorest in New Haven.28  
 
                                                     
22 Lassonde, 21 (citing Thelma A. Dreis, A HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL STATISTICS OF NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936) 
23 Rae, Douglas, 264. CITY: URBANISM AND ITS END. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. 
24 Rae, 272 (citing estimates based on 1930 Census data from Wards 10, 11, 12 and 27, plus 30 percent of Ward 25 
and 10 percent of Ward 14). 
25 Rae, 265 (citing Home Owners' Loan Corporation, Residential Security Map and Explanation, New Haven, 
Connecticut, October 1937). 
26 Rae, 266.  
27 Id. 
28 For instance, in 1950, ninety percent of households in Wooster Square had incomes less than the city’s median. 
Brainard, 11.  
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III. WEST AND BEST: REDIRECTING HIGHWAYS IN WOOSTER SQUARE  
 
In its first hundred years, Wooster Square was transformed from an elite enclave to a thriving 
industrial district, and eventually to a poor and working-class area that had fallen on hard 
times. The next fifteen years would provide unprecedented opportunities to transform the 
neighborhood, and, in so doing, to uplift the status of the relatively small number of residents 
who collaborated with city officials to remake the neighborhood in their vision. Although many 
treatments of mid-century Wooster Square focus primarily, or even exclusively urban renewal 
projects, highway plans that threatened to destroy the west “and best” part of the neighborhood 
helped to galvanize neighborhood leaders to action in the early 1950s, providing the first 
opportunity for residents of the west side to assert control over the future of Wooster Square. 
Working closely with city planners, these leaders – many of whom became involved with the 
Wooster Square Renewal Committee in the years that followed – were able to transform a plan 
that threatened to destroy the whole neighborhood into one that would preserve its western 
portion while razing and isolating poorer areas in the east.  
 
In the early 1950s, the Connecticut State Highway Department began to plan for a northward 
extension of the Connecticut Turnpike through eastern New Haven. The highway was part of a 
broader plan to establish New Haven as “a gateway city, as an open door where highway traffic 
from Interstate 91 north and 95 south could conveniently enter by the newly constructed Oak 
Street Connector.”29 As initially conceived, the plan for Wooster Square called for the new 
highway to lead north from the existing Turnpike along the western side of the neighborhood 
– a strategy that would have destroyed hundreds of homes, including the Court Street row 
                                                     
29 Riccio, 404. 
 9
houses. To state planners, shabby tenements and a small handful of nicer structures might well 
have seemed a small price to pay for progress. But many residents of Wooster Square 
strenuously objected to the destruction of what they believed was the finest part of 
neighborhood. Over the next several years, popular opposition to the state’s designs mounted, 
and city officials – spurred by popular protest and led by William Celentano,30 who had become 
the city’s first Italian-American mayor in 1945 – repeatedly pressured the state highway 
department to alter the plan.  
 
In the spring of 1950, city officials created a counter-proposal and presented its idea for a 
highway east of Wooster Square Park to the state highway department; they were met with 
resistance. 31 By the following year, the City had assembled data on family relocation and other 
costs associated with different versions of the plan and had a stronger case for its proposal, 
arguing that an eastern positioning would avoid destruction of the area’s more refined homes, 
tie in better with major traffic arteries downtown, and clear more of the area’s substandard 
housing.32 Despite this input, when state highway engineers completed their study for the 
proposed highway in 1952, they remained committed to the western position.33 Popular 
support for the City’s plan continued to rise, and Wooster Square residents strongly objected 
that the Highway Department’s plan “would bring Interstate 91 through the west (and best) 
side of the neighborhood." 34 Several members of the community lobbied city officials and 
“succeeded in persuading the City Planning Department to develop a general plan for the 
                                                     
30 Talbot, Albert, 108. THE MAYOR’S GAME: RICHARD LEE OF NEW HAVEN AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE. New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1967. 
31 Hasbrouck, Sherman, 10-11. Transformation: A Summary of New Haven's Development Program. Report prepared 
for Masters of Urban Student Program at Yale. May 28, 1965 (revd December 1965). 
32 Id. 
33 Hommann, WOOSTER SQUARE DESIGN, 21. 
34 Hasbrouck, 11. 
 10 
area;”35 ultimately, the city planners’ assessment put the total cost of the state highway plan at 
$300,000 more than the City’s proposal. By 1953, the state had adopted the City’s proposed 
alignment,36 and construction began in 1956.37 
 
On its face, the adoption of the eastern 
positioning was an obvious choice. Many 
residents seemed to prefer it, city planners had 
rated the eastern position as the less costly 
highway plan, and separating the primarily 
industrial section in the east from the primarily 
residential section in the west also seemed like 
a worthy goal.39 But the decision also had the 
effect of displacing hundreds of people in the 
poorest section of the neighborhood, and of isolating many homes that fell on the wrong side of 
the line. Supporters of the plan underscored the destruction of “slum housing” as a benefit of 
the proposed alignment, not an unfortunate consequence of it. Although concerns about the 
quality of residential buildings on the eastern side were well-founded – many homes lacked 
private toilets, kitchens, and other basic necessities, and many had deteriorated as a result of 
years of divestment and neglect – highway construction became a tool to excise undesirable 
poor people as well as buildings. Residents who later came together as the Wooster Square 
Renewal Committee would stress the importance of finding ways to rehouse those displaced by 
                                                     
35 Citizen Participation In Urban Renewal, 66 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 485, 543 (Mar., 1966). 
36 Hommann, WOOSTER SQUARE DESIGN, 21.  
37 Hasbrouck, 11. 
38 Proposed Expressway Network Comparison Between Alternate Proposals. City of New Haven, ca. 1953. New 
Haven Colony Historical Society. 
39 Hommann, WOOSTER SQUARE DESIGN, 26. 
 
Proposed expressway network: comparison 
between alternate proposals. “The State Highway 
Department Solution Tends to Depreciate This … 
Further,” reads the caption, pointing to the area 
around the park.38 
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the highway within Wooster Square, but those same residents opposed the construction of new 
public housing in the area,40 and a concrete plan to address the needs of those displaced was not 
reached until 1958.41 Even then, rehousing of residents posed significant challenges and was 
dependent on the efforts of the overwhelmed and under-resourced Relocation Office (see 
section VIII, “The Displaced,” infra).  
 
The decision also placed the Farnam Courts public housing project – built little more than a 
decade before the plans for the highway were put in place – on the industrial side of the new 
expressway. Those in favor of the plan rationalized that locating the highway to the east of 
Farnam Courts “would have … reduced [the size of the industrial park] to the point where it 
would have been useless.”42 Public housing was, in its early years, neither as racially segregated 
nor as stigmatized as it would eventually become43, so it is possible that those favoring an 
eastern highway did not deliberately seek to cordon off the project but instead genuinely 
believed that “public housing tenants would be able simply to walk under the highway bridge” 
to reach the rest of the neighborhood.44 But the fact that members of the Wooster Square 
Renewal Committee would, just a few years later, unanimously oppose the creation of any 
additional public housing in the area gives reason for pause. If more public housing seemed like 
too much, was it because the existing public housing already seemed like too much? Whether or 
                                                     
40 Report on Wooster Square Meeting, May 25, 1955. Richard Charles Lee Papers, Box 7, Folder 179: 
Correspondence – Wooster Square, 1955. Yale University. 
41 Relocation Plan of the New Haven Redevelopment Agency for the State of Connecticut Highway department in 
Connection with the Interstate 91 Highway Program under Section 13-112, Chapter 23h of the 1958 Revision of 
the Connecticut General Statutes, 1958. Alvin A. Mermin Papers, Box VIII, Folder C: Wooster Square Project. 
New Haven Colony Historical Society. 
42 Hommann, WOOSTER SQUARE DESIGN, 29. 
43 Farnam Court’s early residents were mainly working-class white families, and through the mid-1960s, the 
project remained majority white. Because public housing was initially regarding as a stepping stone for working 
families, “little to no stigma attached itself to public housing in these early years.” Rae, 278. 
44 Hommann, WOOSTER SQUARE DESIGN, 29. 
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not it was intentional, the isolation of Farnam Courts would contribute to the project’s 
significant decline in the decades to come.  
 
While the motives of those supporting an eastern highway placement were likely mixed, the 
result was crystal clear: over the next decade, the construction of Interstate 91 would come to 
displace hundreds of residents unfortunate enough to fall in its path or on the “wrong side” of 
the road. Residents who were able to organize to protect their homes and interests succeeded 
influencing the city and state’s decision-making processes, but did so at the expense of 
neighbors whose presence was perceived as less valuable and less integral to the future of the 
community. As the first significant collaboration between the city and homeowners on Wooster 
Square’s west side and a framework around which all subsequent decisions in the neighborhood 
would be made, the placement of I-91 is a critical part of the story of urban renewal in Wooster 
Square. (Indeed, the New Haven Redevelopment Agency would later describe the expressway 
as “the very heart of the renewal plan.”45) Nevertheless, the decision regarding the placement of 
Wooster Square’s highway received minimal attention or active praise in many histories of the 
urban renewal period. For instance, Wooster Square Design (1965), a popular early history of this 
period written by Mary Hommann, the Director of the Wooster Square Project, uncritically 
approved of the project’s goal of dividing “two completely diverse areas” and doing so with an 
elevated highway that “more satisfactorily separated the two divergent land uses from the 
visual standpoint.”46 Although Hommann’s “completely diverse areas” referred to the primarily 
residential uses of the west end and the primarily industrial uses of the east end, her description 
                                                     
45 Michael H. Carriere, 2010. Between being and becoming: on architecture, student protest, and the aesthetics of liberalism 
in postwar America. Thesis (Ph. D.), University of Chicago, 2010 (citing New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 
“Wooster Square Redevelopment and Renewal Plan,” New Haven Redevelopment Agency records, Box 102, 
“Wooster Square Redevelopment and Renewal Plan” folder, and New Haven Redevelopment Agency, “Traffic and 
Parking Factors in Wooster Square Renewal Area,” n.d., 2, New Haven Redevelopment Agency records, Box 101, 
“Part I, Final Project Report, Wooster Square (2 of 2)” folder). 
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rendered invisible the many homes situated east of the proposed expressway while altogether 
ignoring a third group: those in the path of the highway itself. Similarly, Fred Powledge’s 
classic Model City (1970), while critical of other elements of urban renewal, lavished praise on 
the highway planning and emphasized its economic benefits, writing that, “An expressway, 
which often guarantees little more than a first-rate urban controversy, was used in Wooster 
Square to the neighborhood's advantage … [I-91 served as] a buffer between the rehabilitated 
housing and the cleared industrial slums. The cleared land … soon attracted more than $11 
million in private investments.”47 While the highway was indeed advantageous to those who 
lived to the west of it, its benefits were far from obvious to those who fell in its path. Howard 
Hallman, a longtime staff member of the New Haven Redevelopment Agency and one of the 
founders of Community Progress Inc,48 included the story of Wooster Square in a 1970 
collection focused on neighborhood control of public programs. Focusing only on the period 
from 1959-1965, Hallman began his telling of urban renewal by noting that, “Already the city 
planning commission and the state highway department had agreed upon an expressway to 
bisect the Wooster Square neighborhood, and this, combined with the deteriorated conditions, 
practically foreordained total clearance east of the highway.”49 By limiting his analysis to the 
period after highway decisions were made and glossing over the fate of the eastern section as 
“practically foreordained,” Hallman obscured the role west-side homeowners in Wooster 
Square played in deciding the fate of their neighbors. But the role played by these actors had 
been a significant one. With the help of city officials, it was a role a small handful of Wooster 
Square’s residents would continue to play for many years to come. 
                                                     
47 Powledge, 41.  
48 Noel A. Cazenave, 38. THE URBAN RACIAL STATE: MANAGING RACE RELATIONS IN AMERICAN CITIES. United 
Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011. 
49 Howard Hallman,167. NEIGHBORHOOD CONTROL OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS: CASE STUDIES OF COMMUNITY 
CORPORATIONS AND NEIGHBORHOOD BOARDS. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. 
 14 
IV. NEXT UP: URBAN RENEWAL 
 
The passage of the federal Housing Act of 1949 signaled a new era in New Haven: one in which 
“the elimination of sub-standard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums 
and blighted areas”50 would take on paramount importance. Mayor Lee, the dynamic and 
controversial leader who unseated Mayor Celentano in the election of 1953, aggressively 
pursued urban renewal projects in an effort to transform New Haven into a model city. 
Consistent with the mandates of the original Act, the city’s earliest projects in Oak Street and 
the Church Street area involved extensive clearance. But a 1953 evaluation of federal Act would 
prompt a change in approach, both nationwide and in New Haven. Citing the extraordinarily 
high costs of demolishing and rebuilding city slums, mounting opposition to total clearance, 
and the logistical nightmares posed by massive relocation, the President’s Advisory Committee 
on Government Housing Policies and Programs recommended that the program be amended to 
allow cities to put federal funding toward rehabilitation of sub-standard housing, not only 
removal and rebuilding.51 Congress adopted this approach in the Housing Act of 1954, opening 
a pipeline of federal funding for projects that would dramatically transform neighborhoods 
while leaving portions of their underlying structure intact.  
 
Wooster Square became the first city in the nation to make use of the revised Housing Act’s 
support for rehabilitation.52 Several key factors made it an ideal candidate for this form of urban 
renewal. The are was one of the poorest in New Haven, and struggled with numerous social 
ills. Nearly eight in ten adults in New Haven’s inner-city neighborhoods had never finished 
                                                     
50 Housing Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-171). 
51 Citizen Participation In Urban Renewal, 490.  
52 Powledge, 39. 
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high school.53 The rates of unemployment and juvenile delinquency were nearly twice as high 
as those in other parts of the city.54 Years of redlining had also taken their toll on Wooster 
Square; the Wooster Square Project Area included most of one of the areas the federal Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation had blacklisted for investment purposes years before.55 Somewhat 
ironically, the new influx of federal renewal money was most needed in Wooster Square and 
other neighborhoods that had declined as the result of earlier federal policies that had cut these 
areas off from much-needed capital. At the same time, the neighborhood contained numerous 
buildings with long histories, interesting architectural details and essentially sound structures, 
making the area an ideal setting for rehabilitation. The highway renewal project had also 
helped to galvanize an organized group of residents committed to making change in their 
neighborhood, which made urban renewal seem like a natural next step.  
 
A. An Alliance is Formed 
 
After the passage of the Housing Act of 1949, a group of Wooster Square residents, led by the 
pastor of a local church, began clean-up activities in the area56 and started to discuss the 
possibility of applying for federal funding to restore the neighborhood to its former glory.57 
The group approached Mayor Celentano and the Yale University Planning Department with 
their ideas, and Yale made the Wooster Square area the subject of a thesis exercise for its 
                                                     
53 Murphy, Russell D, 17. POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS AND URBAN POVERTY: THE STRATEGIES OF POLICY 
INNOVATION IN NEW HAVEN'S MODEL ANTI-POVERTY PROJECT. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Company, 1971 
(citing numerous sources). 
54 Murphy, 17.  
55 Rae, 282 (citing estimates based on 1930 Census data from Wards 10, 11, 12 and 27, plus 30 percent of Ward 25 
and 10 percent of Ward 14). 
56 Hallman, 167. 
57 Wooster Square Redevelopment and Renewal Plan: Hearing Before the Aldermanic Committee on Streets and Squares 
(New Haven, July 14, 1958) (statement of Rev. Lawrence W. Doucette, 24). 
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students, one of whom would later be hired by the New Haven City Plan Commission to serve 
as the chief planner of the Wooster Square renewal project.58 In May of 1955, the group then 
known as the Wooster Square Committee convened a meeting of roughly sixty residents to 
discuss the urban renewal program, and Mary Small, a community relations specialist with the 
city planning department, explained the contours of the federal housing program. The 
residents at the meeting agreed to request that the Commission designate Wooster Square as 
an urban renewal area and authorize enforcement of the local housing code to eliminate sub-
standard conditions in the area,59 and in June, the committee renamed itself the Wooster 
Square Neighborhood Renewal Committee.60 This group provided a ready network of support 
for renewal in Wooster Square, greatly facilitating the planning of the project.  
 
Mayor Lee was likely eager to spearhead urban renewal in Wooster Square in hopes of winning 
over the Italian voters he had long coveted. Although Italian immigrants “took significantly 
longer than the city’s other immigrant groups to assert their political will”61 in New Haven, 
they rallied around Celentano when he became the first Italian to capture a major-party 
mayoral nomination in 1939.62 Celentano lost that election by a small margin, but he carried 
over seventy percent of the votes in Wooster Square’s Tenth and Eleventh Wards.63 That same 
year, the Board of Aldermen saw a rapid increase in the number of Italian GOP 
representatives,64 and in the coming years, Celentano would bring thousands of Italians into 
                                                     
58 Hommann, WOOSTER SQUARE DESIGN, 19. 
59 Report on Wooster Square Meeting, May 25, 1955. Richard Charles Lee Papers, Box 7, Folder 179: 
Correspondence – Wooster Square, 1955.  
60 Report on Wooster Square Meeting, June 30, 1955. Lee Papers, Box 7, Folder 179: Correspondence – Wooster 
Square, 1955.  
61 Stephen Lassonde, LEARNING TO FORGET : SCHOOLING AND FAMILY LIFE IN NEW HAVEN'S WORKING CLASS, 
1870-1940, Yale University Press, 2005. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost).  
62 Rae, 292. 
63 Robert A. Dahl, 50-51. WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2005 (second edition). 
64 Rae, 292.  
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the Republican Party, including many in Wooster Square. 65 Celentano was elected mayor in 
1945 and defeated Richard Lee in both 1949 and 1951, in large part thanks to substantial 
margins of victory in Wooster Square.66 Even though Lee finally bested Celentano in 1953, his 
popularity among Italians remained limited. Urban renewal offered the mayor an opportunity 
to win the affections of Italian voters in Wooster Square, and in particular the support of the 
homeowners who could cash in on the FHA-backed mortgages and other resources the renewal 
project promised. Collaborating with neighborhood leaders on local development became one of 
many strategies Lee would employ to win over Italian voters and break into Wooster Square’s 
Republican stronghold. 67  
 
Over the next several years, Mary Small would meet with the Wooster Square Neighborhood 
Renewal Committee regularly, presenting tentative plans and allowing the committee to 
respond to the proposals.68 Working under the aegis of the Redevelopment Agency,69 the 
Committee initially included six representatives and eventually grew to 30-35 members.70 By 
all accounts, the Committee had a considerable influence on the development of the renewal 
project and a positive, highly collaborative relationship with the Redevelopment Agency. For 
example, the Committee was opposed to the creation of either high-rise or public housing in the 
area, and consistent with this preference, only low-rise, middle-income cooperative units would 
ultimately be built.71 From 1955-1958, the Committee met an incredible 62 times.72 Mayor Lee 
and his staff were also intimately involved with Wooster Square residents during the planning 
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phases of the project and were highly responsive to concerns expressed by residents who lived 
around the square. For example, in 1955, the Redevelopment Agency agreed to pay for the 
costs of renovating a much-beloved statute of Christopher Columbus after locals objected to the 
appropriateness of residents paying for such a renovation themselves; this was done despite the 
fact that a neighborhood committee had already taken it upon itself to raise funds for the 
project.73 Mayor Lee’s right-hand man, Development Administrator Ed Logue, also got 
involved in the minute details of life in Wooster Square, urging the traffic department to take 
action after the Committee expressed concerns about a traffic light, parking and local speed 
limit: “Would you please give these matters your prompt attention since we are anxious to do 
all we can to prevent this neighborhood from deteriorating further during the interim while we 
are waiting for the final approval of the Wooster Square application.” 74 When the Committee 
expressed concern about “bums” congregating on the square, Logue wrote to the chief of police 
to suggest having a Sunday morning patrol to get rid of them. “As you know,” Logue wrote, 
“we are anxious to do all we can in this neighborhood during the interim period, and we must 
wait until the Federal government gives final approval to our renewal application…”75 Time 
and again, Lee and the Redevelopment Agency intervened on what appeared to be small 
matters, committed to ensuring that the collaboration with residents in Wooster Square would 
be a success. 
 
Given their intimate involvement in the planning phase and the City’s degree of responsiveness 
to their concerns, it is no surprise that Committee members enthusiastically testified in favor of 
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the plan when it was unveiled at a public hearing in mid-1958.76 Later, committee members 
were also involved in the implementation of the plan. One of the core members of the 
Committee, Ted DeLauro, was later hired to serve as a neighborhood representative for the 
project.77 He and other local leaders hired to work for the Redevelopment Agency actively 
reached out to the homeowners in the community, helping to explain the renewal project to 
them and encourage compliance with its provisions. 
 
B. Who Was Left Out? 
 
Although the Committee played a key role in the development of Wooster Square’s urban 
renewal initiative, there are many indications that the Committee reflected the values of only a 
small subset of the neighborhood’s population. Specifically, it disproportionately reflected the 
interests of homeowners, excluded homeowners on the east side whose properties would later 
be demolished, included only longtime residents, and was ethnically homogeneous despite the 
community’s growing black population. 
 
In building relationships with the community, the City drew heavily on the contacts it had 
formed during the highway placement process: homeowners on the western side who were 
concerned about what they perceived as the decline of the neighborhood,78 and their resulting 
inability to secure mortgage financing to improve their properties. The concerns voiced at one 
of the committee’s earliest meetings reflect these concerns; most comments emphasized 
housing code enforcement to eliminate sub-standard conditions, the availability of new 
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mortgages under the Federal Housing Administration, and “unanimous disapproval” of public 
housing projects.79 As one member of the Committee would later explain at a 1958 public 
hearing on the plan, “I went to five different banks in one afternoon [to get a mortgage]. Some 
of them said they didn’t have any more applications when they heard that I bought a property 
on St. John Street. Well, before the day was over they ran out of applications and I ran out of 
banks.” 80 Homeowners were eager to bring urban renewal to Wooster Square because Section 
220 of the National Housing Act would enable them to apply for federally-insured private 
mortgages to finance any repairs necessary to bring their homes into alignment with property 
rehabilitation standards.81 This program was an obvious boon to homeowners who had been 
redlined for years; it was also in direct opposition to the needs of tenants and roomers who 
would be pushed out as rehabilitation efforts got underway. Although the Committee did not 
consist entirely of homeowners – of twenty-five core members, fifteen were resident property 
owners, and several more lived in property owned by their relatives82 – it disproportionately 
reflected the interests of the property owners for whom urban renewal would serve as a 
windfall. 
 
Even within the category of homeowners, the Committee failed to represent the interests of all 
those included within the renewal area. Critics of the plan would later note that “the people 
who live in the western half of the neighborhood [formed the Committee because they] were 
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aware of the threat to their homes and investments,”83 and then approved plans for the city to 
either purchase or condemn property east of the new highway route without consulting east 
side property owners. But “no special effort was made to make [the Committee] broadly 
representative,” and “no by-laws or election procedures were set up…”84 While the group 
included residents of almost every rehabilitation block,85 no residents of the future clearance 
area – whether homeowners or tenants – were involved.86 Nearly all of the committee members 
were lifelong residents of the neighborhood, and more recent arrivals to the neighborhood were 
left out.87 No effort was made to represent the community's poorer elements, or to broaden the 
Committee beyond its initial membership.88  
 
The Wooster Square Renewal Committee was also almost entirely Italian,89 despite the 
growing number of black residents in the neighborhood. During the 1950s, the number of black 
people in New Haven more than doubled, the result of both natural increase and of in-
migration, including from the rural South.90 Much of this growth was concentrated in inner-
city neighborhoods, including Wooster Square.91 Although Wooster Square remained majority 
Italian, by 1960, almost a quarter of the neighborhood’s population was black.92 Many black 
people in the neighborhood – some 2,000 by the time redevelopment began in the early 1960s – 
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were concentrated in the most dilapidated areas, particularly on the eastern side93 and in the 
area north of Grand Avenue. Just as Italians and other immigrants had done in the decades 
before, black people moved to New Haven in search of economic opportunity, but in their case, 
“the timing couldn't have been worse. Just as blacks began arriving in numbers … those factory 
wage dollars were disappearing from central city New Haven…”94 With few other affordable 
options, hundreds of families displaced by the Oak Street project – many of them black families 
– moved to the poorest sections of Wooster Square,95 heightening fears that without swift 
action Wooster Square would soon become an unsalvageable slum. Although Wooster Square’s 
decline had begun long before black people became a significant presence in the neighborhood, 
many Italian residents of Wooster Square blamed the influx of black residents for the decline 
and saw urban renewal as a means of removing black people96 – a necessary step to save the 
area from the harsh fate that had befallen Oak Street. Pleas to consider the needs of the city’s 
growing black population frequently fell on deaf ears. As one democratic alderman described, 
“Wherever there are large groups of white citizens of immigrant extraction one argument 
against the civil rights movement … recurs incessantly. ‘Nobody helped us’… ‘We Italians had 
to work our own way up – why can’t they?’ … In New Haven’s struggles this argument must 
have been used, by conservative estimate, eighty-seven thousand times.”97 The sense that black 
people did not deserve a leg-up hardened the sympathies of many Italian-Americans in Wooster 
Square, even as they pursued government support for themselves.  
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Many Italian homeowners in Wooster Square likely saw urban renewal as an opportunity to 
improve their social and economic status. According to Robert Dahl in his classic Who 
Governs?, ethnic groups pass through three stages on the way to political assimilation. In the 
first stage, they are working-class, unskilled laborers “low in status, income and influence.”98 In 
the second stage, many group members remain working-class, but others begin to access white-
collar jobs, higher levels of wealth, more social standing, and greater political clout. Ethnic 
group members begin to challenge and unseat incumbents, entering the political arena.99 
Working class and middle-income Italian homeowners in Wooster Square may have seen the 
project as a chance to enter Dahl’s third stage, in which, “Large segments are assimilated into 
the middling and upper strata; they have middle-class jobs, accept middle-class ideas, adopt a 
middle-class style of live, live in middle-class neighborhoods…”100 Even though Italians had 
become increasingly mobile and influential within New Haven and just 45% of them lived in 
Wooster Square by 1940, their over-representation in the struggling neighborhood had led 
Italians to be “identified with this slum area, and … [thought to possess] the undesirable 
characteristics of slum dwellers.”101 For some Italians, breaking into the upper class had 
required moving away from heavily Italian neighborhoods and into less ethnically identifiable 
areas.102 During the urban renewal period, struggling homeowners could instead use city 
support and federal funding to transform Wooster Square itself into the “right kind” of 
neighborhood and in the process lift themselves up to the middle class.  
 
Both the City and the members of the Wooster Square Renewal Committee looked to the past 
as a model for what they hoped lay ahead in the future. Residents longed to see the 
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neighborhood “redeveloped into a fine residential section, as it used to be.”103 On its part, the 
City had “long been aware of the desirability of preserving and restoring this area to its 
original condition.”104 The Wooster Square represented by stately Victorian homes once 
occupied by the city’s elite became the touchstone for reformers who sought to recapture the 
area’s “original,” if short-lived, glory. Thus, “Pervasive agency control in … Wooster Square 
[was] not the result of deliberate machinations by the Redevelopment Agency, but occur[ed] 
because citizens groups, from their inception, [were] so identified with agency renewal goals 
that effective resistance to what might be major defects in a plan [was] unlikely.” 105 Coalescing 
around the goal of restoring the area to its former splendor, the City and the Committee 
worked hand in hand to make their vision of the neighborhood a reality.  
 
V. THE PLAN FOR WOOSTER SQUARE  
One point I would like to make absolutely clear: this is not a wholesale clearance program… What can be 
finer than a united neighborhood, a united community working hand in glove toward one common goal – 
the first slumless American city?106 
 
Urban renewal in Wooster Square was seen by many as a preventative measure: a set of 
dramatic interventions that could help save the neighborhood from a terrible future. Unlike the 
Oak Street area, which many regarded as an unsalvageable slum at the time it was targeted for 
clearance, Wooster Square was seen as a neighborhood that had begun to decline but was still 
in decent shape. When conversations about urban renewal in Wooster Square began, many 
homeowners had already begun extensive remodeling on their own, and demand for rental 
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units in the area was high.107 As the Renewal Committee observed in a 1955 meeting, “Such a 
demand seems to indicate that Wooster Square is still a good place to live and with the Urban 
Renewal program it will become an even more desirable residential area.”108 Later on, a 
pamphlet describing the urban renewal project noted that the prospect of decline “may not be 
apparent because Wooster Square is in many ways still a pleasant place to live – within easy  
walking distance of Downtown, with a lovely park, 
many fine old homes, churches, and schools...” 110  
 
But the Redevelopment Agency, Renewal Committee 
and other supporters of urban renewal urged the 
public not to be lulled into complacency by the 
virtues of the neighborhood as it was. Instead, they 
stressed the neighborhood’s gradual decline, 
particularly in the postwar years, and pointed to the 
growing number of industrial uses as a threat to the 
residential character of the neighborhood.111 “Our 
Neighborhood is in Danger,” cautioned one pamphlet, 
resorting to images of death and destruction to get its 
point across:  
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Specter of the slums. Residents were 
warned that swift action was needed to 
prevent Wooster Square from becoming 




In 17 years, 35 people have lost their lives in fires in this section… This is a 
fearfully high price to pay. We cannot afford it. Other dangers… threaten to 
destroy the Wooster Square neighborhood and make it New Haven’s largest 
slum in 10 years or less… The neighborhood cannot survive in the face of these 
conditions… All these fine things will be lost unless – the bad influences are 
eliminated.112 
 
The Redevelopment Agency and Renewal Committee stressed that there was no time to lose: 
“Experience in the Oak Street area has shown that if these trends are not halted the area will 
become a slum with clearance as the only remedy. There is hope for a better fate for Wooster 
Square, if the city and the people act promptly.” 113 
 
The plan for urban renewal in Wooster Square involved a multitude of strategies. 
Rehabilitation would aim to bring homes into compliance with housing code requirements and 
restore their lost beauty; clearance would rid the area of dilapidated homes. A new school and 
community center would be established to replace several older schools that then served the 
neighborhood. East of the new highway route, a commercial-industrial park would be 
established, replacing run-down factories with more modern facilities and leaving room for new 
industry to develop.114 The plan also aimed to create a limited amount of low- and moderate-
income housing. The ambitious proposal aimed to put everything in its place, segregating the 
hodgepodge of industrial, commercial and residential facilities into orderly areas separated by 
the new highway.115 The federal government would provide two thirds of the total project 
costs – over $24 million116 to acquire properties to be torn down and to cover other project 
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costs. Under the terms of the Housing Act, the city was obliged to cover the remaining third of 
the project costs, but New Haven would not spend any of its own cash on the project, instead 
receiving some credit for capital improvements and financing the remainder of its share with 
State aid.117 
 
The plan called for the clearance of 517 out of 903 residential structures in the project area; the 
buildings slated for destruction contained 1563 dwelling units.118 The Redevelopment Agency 
justified this radical decision in two ways. First, the Agency issued findings that a significant 
portion of the units to be destroyed were substandard.119 Citing the high rate of fires, arrests,120 
and other vices in the project area, the Agency asserted that clearance was needed to protect 
those who lived in substandard housing and their neighbors. The Agency also justified the high 
degree of housing clearance as a necessary component of its overall strategy of establishing 
order in the project area. Stemming the tide of deterioration was deemed to be so important 
that even eliminating housing that was not substandard was “specifically found [by the 
Agency] to be essential to complete an adequate unit of development and the Wooster Square 
Redevelopment and Renewal Area as a whole is hereby found to be deteriorated, substandard 
and detrimental.”121 Declaring the entire area to be substandard empowered the Redevelopment 
Agency to make liberal use of its power of eminent domain. Establishing orderly distinctions 
between different parts of the project area was the overriding concern; if some perfectly sound 
structures had to be destroyed in the process, so be it. 
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After considerable back and forth between the Redevelopment Agency and the Wooster Square 
Renewal Committee, the plan for the area was finally in place. All that remained was to share it 
with the residents whose lives would soon be upended. 
VI. PUBLIC HEARING IN 1958 
It is unfortunate some people have to get hurt, to carry on progress. As you say, some are on the other side 
of the stew, or the track … If they want to improve the neighborhood, if I have to be relocated, all well 
and good… we are sorry but somebody has got to get hurt … maybe I will meet some of your people on 
the street and maybe you will snub me and say, ‘Because your house isn’t going down,’ and so forth. But I 
have the guts … Let’s face it … it is for our benefit.122 
 
Amidst the chorus of praise for this beneficent project there have been sounded a few discordant notes, not 
powerful, but significant nonetheless, a small voice from the little people who are afraid that they will be 
gobbled up and left high and dry.123  
 
During the summer of 1958, the Redevelopment Agency and the Aldermanic Committee hosted 
two significant public forums to discuss the plan for the Wooster Square Project Area. Many of 
the major histories of this period fail to mention these meetings,124 even treatments that go into 
detail about the relationship between the Renewal Committee and city planners125 or other 
dynamics around the process of approving the renewal plan.126 One of the few accounts that 
does allude to these hearings does so only to mention that members of the Renewal Committee 
“gave enthusiastic support” for the plan they had helped to create.127 The Redevelopment 
Agency’s 1965 book on urban renewal in Wooster Square focused on the testimony of members 
of the Wooster Square Renewal Committee, writing that “the committee sent representatives 
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[to the 1958 hearings] to speak eloquently in favor of the plan’s adoption” and enumerating 
many of the other groups who supported the plan.128 This is true, but it is only part of the 
story. Transcripts of these two meetings reveal that in the weeks before it was approved, the 
plan for Wooster Square remained a deeply contentious issue in the community – one that 
reflected a complicated mixture of good intentions, fear, competing values, and 
misunderstandings. Many residents, particularly those on the east side, felt that the plan was 
rushed, not transparent, and not mindful of the needs of residents soon to be displaced. Though 
the plan in Wooster Square was subsequently lauded as having been the product of widespread 
community involvement and support, the discussion at the 1958 public hearings makes plain 
that critical interests were left out both in the decision-making process and in many histories 
that would later laud those processes.  
 
At the 1958 meeting, supporters of the Wooster Square renewal plan displayed the 
uncomfortable mixture of concern for and fear of poor people common to many proponents of 
urban renewal. The testimony of Michael Zito, a member of the Renewal Committee and a 
foreman at the Sargent Company, serves as an example of this tension. Referencing that his 
own home had “all the modern conveniences,” he related his surprise and dismay at the 
conditions he encountered when he visited the homes of his employees: “believe me, the filth 
that I saw in some of the areas, in the houses, and the rundown conditions, and the people, how 
they live there is beyond me.”129 The pastor of a church on Grand Avenue also spoke out in 
support of the plan, denouncing the inhuman conditions of many homes in the neighborhood 
and asking that the City do better by its people:  
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I have been nauseated at the terrible conditions under which some people have 
been forced to live … places fit for two or three families to live in now inhabited 
by Lord knows how many people … vermin creeping on the walls, children 
being brought up in such circumstances. It is a terrible experience. However, in 
the midst of this very neighborhood we have wonderful people … They are 
excellent people, boys and girls growing up in the midst of such conditions, 
nevertheless leading virtuous, good, holy lives, fathers and mothers raising fine 
families … conditions are such that certainly a long time ago something should 
have been done about it.130 
 
Like many others, the pastor supported urban renewal because he believed that it could help 
improve living conditions that seemed, to him, intolerably and unforgivably bad. 
 
Although some had good intentions toward the people who stood to be displaced by the project, 
many proponents of the Wooster Square plan were also plainly motivated by fear. Many of the 
statements focused on the specter of the slums, suggesting that disease from the slums could 
spread elsewhere and that the slums themselves were a disease that would harm Wooster Square 
if not innoculated right away. At the June 1958 hearing, New Haven’s Director of Public 
Health spoke in favor of the plan, noting that,  
Federal records show that on a nation-wide basis, slums are directly involved in 60% of 
all tuberculosis cases and 50% of all diseases. And of course, disease cannot be contained 
in any one neighborhood. It spreads from poor housing, to good housing. Thus, every 
citizen of New Haven, no matter where he lives, is directly threatened by the existence 
of slums and the diseases they spread … Not only is this the tool to eliminate areas of 
high disease frequency – but it is the tool to eliminate areas from which disease spreads 
through an entire community.131 
 
A representative of the Council of Social Agencies argued that slum clearance was needed to 
help preserve the quality of the Farnam Courts project because “the slums … move out and 
                                                     
130 Wooster Square Redevelopment and Renewal Plan: Hearing At City Hall (New Haven, June 30, 1958) (statement of 
Reverend Michael McVerry, 79-80). 
131 Statement of Dr. Clement F. Batelli, Director of Public Health. New Haven Redevelopment Agency hearing, 
June 30, 1958. Lee Papers, Box 18, Folder 450.  
 31 
creep in and infect everything they come in contact with.” 132 The encroachment of industrial 
uses in primarily residential areas was also described like a dangerous sickness, “a cancerous 
growth” that would destroy the neighborhood if not halted soon.133 In these and similar 
comments, supporters of the plan spoke as though slums and storefronts had taken on a lives of 
their own and actively were threatening to strangle everything else. 
 
Some longtime residents laid the blame for the neighborhood’s decline directly on new renters 
and those who let them in. One Italian man who had lived in the area for more than forty years 
criticized absentee landlords who had no investment in maintaining their properties or renting 
only to appropriate tenants. “Three families in one, two families in one… It is really a mess,” he 
complained.”134 Noting that she too had come from a big family, she stressed that the quality of 
family was not what it had been in the past. “We were well behaved. Today the parents say, if 
the kid makes a hole in the wall, ‘You mustn’t cry. You can knock it down.’ They don’t care, 
because they don’t have to pay for the buildings.”135 Similarly, another homeowner stressed 
that the value of his home had declined because the area was deteriorating, a phenomenon he 
also seemed to blame on the area’s newcomers. “Would you live in the area with these people?” 
he asked, challenging supporters of the plan. “Would you share favors with each other? No.”136 
Although Wooster Square remained majority-Italian in the late 1950s, the stream of 
newcomers from the Oak Street area and elsewhere had begun to shift Wooster Square’s 
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demographics significantly, and it is clear that many of those who supported renewal did so in 
part because of their discomfort with “these people” moving in.  
 
Those who supported the plan emphasized that time was of the essence. One longtime resident 
and Renewal Committee member urged that, “If something isn’t done in the very near future – 
and I daresay we should not wait too long – blight and slums will be on our back doorsteps 
within a year or two.” 137 Mayor Lee put the decision in dramatic terms, insisting that, “the time 
for delay and the time for waiting is long past. It is later than we think in our community. I 
believe that we have reached the point of no return.”138 Emphasizing the need to shore up New 
Haven’s dwindling tax base, Lee also raised the specter of lives lost in fires as a way to arouse 
the passions of the crowd. “I would like to remind everybody of the lives that were lost in the 
Wooster Square area in the last fifteen years,” he said gravely. “As far as I am concerned, if by 
speeding up this program and getting it underway we save one life, then this program is a 
success.”139 
 
Despite the many statements in favor of the plan – a great many of which were made by 
members of the Renewal Committee or by representatives from various city agencies – serious 
objections were also lodged. Some critics noted that the proponents of the plan had repeatedly 
emphasized health hazards, rat infestations, fires, and other problems in the “slum” areas, but 
that these could be solved “with competent, capable, police and fire departments, and before the 
City resorts to the extravagance of redevelopment” and that the city should “not wait[] upon 
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this project before it attends to the rodent problem.”140 Though the renewal area did face its 
problems, redevelopment was not necessarily the answer to them; “the administration should 
deliver the services of its office, instead of proposed redevelopment schemes, professional 
publicity releases, and elegant brochures as it insists upon redevelopment as a panacea for all 
ills of the City.”141 
 
Many people urged the city not to rush into anything before working out the details, 
particularly given the many urban renewal projects that were already underway. One longtime 
alderman cautioned, “when a city undertakes projects of the magnitude of Oak Street, Church 
Street, and now Wooster Square, all within a short period of time, somewhere along the line 
one should pause and take stock of what has occurred to the other before attempting new 
ones.”142 He pointed out that the projected timeline for the Oak Street project had been 
incorrect, and that land purchases and reconstruction projects had barely begun;143 the same 
could happen in Wooster Square. Another opponent of the plan was even more pointed in his 
criticism:   
How much is it going to cost the people to move back into the area? Who is 
going to build [new housing units]? What are the details concerning those 
things? Don’t you think we ought to know when you are going to displace ‘x’ 
number of people? Are they going to be able to move back here? I don’t know, 
and neither does anybody else.144  
 
A member of the first Redevelopment Commission in New Haven also expressed concern that 
despite the fact that the City had been studying the Wooster Square area as a potential site for 
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renewal since 1951, fully seven years later, “only a chosen few seem to be in full possession of 
the facts. The general public… [is] not fully informed as to the measuring rod used … to 
determine that Wooster Square is to be redeveloped.”145 With more questions than answers, 
many of those who testified at these meetings seemed skeptical of the determination that their 
area needed a complete overhaul. 
 
Several objectors expressed special concern about the problem of rehousing residents displaced 
by the renewal project. A retired engineer underscored that it was wrong “to stampede these 
people out of their homes before you give them a place to go. The federal government didn’t 
give you this money to knock down property,” he chastised. “They gave you money to develop 
slums, low rent conditions, low rent housing for our people.”146 A reverend whose parishioners 
had been uprooted by a previous urban renewal project spoke powerfully about the importance 
of looking out for the poor. Residents had approached him “with downcast minds and bleeding 
hearts. They had to move, and the rents available were beyond their means. They had been 
happy and able to get along in their former rents, which had been condemned.”147 Urging the 
Redevelopment Agency to learn from its mistakes, he added, “I trust that it will not fail that 
this time the poor … will not curse, rather will they bless the authorities for having done their 
best to transplant them to another rent or location where they will still be able to make both 
ends meet.” 148 Other objectors noted that even if new housing were built in Wooster Square, 
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there were no guarantees that those displaced would be able to afford to return; many in Oak 
Street had not.149  
 
Longtime residents poised to be displaced were angry that the plans had not taken their needs 
into account. “Redevelopment, the theory is very good. But … they haven’t approached the 
people who have been living in that neighborhood for forty, fifty, sixty years, spent a lifetime 
down there,” one explained. People had “worked hard for that ‘dump’ that we are living in down 
there … it is our home.” 150  Noting that the Renewal Committee was disproportionately 
homeowners on the western side, an east side homeowner argued that the plan was “grossly 
unfair to the property owners who were not invited to attend any of these meetings. After all, 
they are the ones who are being put out. They are the ones whose homes and property are 
being taken from them.” 151 Though the members of the Renewal Committee strongly identified 
with the goals of the renewal plan, that feeling was far from universal. “Whom does the city 
belong to, the Redevelopment Commission, or to the people who have homes and property, the 
people who live and work here?” one objector asked.152  
 
One critic noted that a single committee of fewer than thirty members and average attendance 
of fifteen was far from enough to serve all of the people the community.153 Given how 
unrepresentative the committee had been, those who opposed the plan were frustrated that it 
seemed like a done deal by the time of the public hearing: 
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This beautiful brochure says, ‘A Message to the people of Wooster Square. Three long, 
hard years of planning are over. The plan is now ready for action.’ In other words, ‘Let’s 
go, let’s get behind this thing, let’s roll.’ I am the one who would like to know, ‘Where 
are we going?’ I have a right to know. I have land that our family has had over fifty 
years. I was born and brought up in the neighborhood. I spent almost every day of my 
entire life there.154 
 
The testimony of one speaker, a longtime resident on the east side, expressed his belief that the 
“entire purpose of this hearing … is to give all of us who have any direct involvement in this 
thing a chance to have our say…”155 But it is clear from the timing of the hearings, the 
numerous meetings of the Renewal Committee that had preceded it, the extensive planned 
testimony of city officials, and the many (and presumably also planned) statements of Renewal 
Committee representatives that the hearings in the summer of 1958 were essentially a 
formality. The time for “direct involvement” had largely past.  
 
Given the large number of people who would ultimately be displaced by the Wooster Square 
project, the fact that there was no coordinated effort to oppose the plan is somewhat surprising. 
There are several possible explanations. Some of Wooster Square’s residents were roomers, and 
as such were a transitory population. Their relatively weak ties to the area, and to each other, 
could account for their lack of involvement in planning its future. Additionally, some residents 
were already making plans to leave as a result of the planning for Interstate 91; they too would 
have had little stake in helping to shape a neighborhood they would soon be departing. On the 
opposite end, hundreds of people in Wooster Square had only arrived in the area within the last 
few years, in many cases as a result of displacement from the Oak Street project. Such new 
arrivals likely would not have had the neighborhood relationships, social currency or political 
clout necessary to launch an opposition to the powerful renewal machine.  
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Mayor Lee had also worked to gain the support of many Italian and black leaders, effectively 
dampening potential opposition from citywide groups like the NAACP. Just as Lee used 
patronage and key appointments to win over many Italians to the Democratic Party, he 
deliberately hired black people to work for the city and made efforts to help black people access 
jobs in the private sector.156 As with the Italians, these efforts “endeared him to the more stable 
black residents of the city who were in a position to benefit from his program” and move into 
middle-class jobs,157 even as poor black people were disproportionately displaced by renewal 
projects.  
 
Several sources suggest another explanation for the relative lack of protest to the Wooster 
Square project plan: many people who would ultimately be affected by it may simply not have 
known that it included them. When the City began to explore the possibility of urban renewal 
in the area in 1955, the chair of the Redevelopment Agency noted that the proposed study area 
was larger than the Wooster Square neighborhood itself, instead comprising most of the Tenth, 
Eleventh and Twelfth Wards.”158 As a result, the Wooster Square project area was considerably 
larger than what many people thought of as the Wooster Square neighborhood, an 
understandable confusion that the press helped to compound and that remained unclear to 
many as late as 1958.159 Though there had been five open neighborhood meetings from 1955-
1958 to discuss the renewal plan and meetings were advertised through newspapers and radio 
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publicity,160 it was clear that the message had not gotten across. At the June 1958 hearing on 
the project, the Executive Director of the Citizens Action Commission clarified that the 
Wooster Square residential neighborhood was: 
a section of fine old houses where the residents have pride in their neighborhood and are 
determined to bring it back to its former condition, as one of the most pleasing and 
desirable parts of the city … [In contrast] the total project area contains … many 
blocks of slums, blight and decay which are a threat not only to the Wooster Square 
neighborhood itself but the well-being of people and property in adjacent sections of 
New Haven.161 
 
The fact that this confusion was apparently so widespread that it needed to be addressed on the 
eve of the project’s approval is troubling. Many residents – including many who had breathed a 
sigh of relief to have escaped the path of the planned highway – were encompassed within a 
project they may understandably have believed had nothing to do with them. Several people at 
the 1958 hearings testified to this effect; one longtime resident explained that he had thought of 
Wooster Square as extending only to Chestnut Street, and “That is why I felt that I had no 
need for concern when this whole thing came up.” 162 Upon realizing he did stand to lose his 
home – which was, according to him, nice and entirely habitable – he wondered why he and 
others on the east side had never been invited to attend any of the Renewal Committee 
meetings. “It is not as though we were not interested. I am sure we are more than interested, 
because it is our homes that are going to be razed to the ground.”163 The dissenting voices at 
the1958 public hearings are all the more powerful when one considers that they likely 
represented only a small fraction of those whose interests were, unbeknownst to them, very 
much at stake.   
                                                     
160 Wooster Square Redevelopment and Renewal Plan: Hearing Before the Aldermanic Committee on Streets and Squares 
(New Haven, July 14, 1958) (statement of Louis Longobardi, 87).  
161 Wooster Square Redevelopment and Renewal Plan: Hearing At City Hall (New Haven, June 30, 1958) (statement of 
Gordon Sweet, 47).  
162 Wooster Square Redevelopment and Renewal Plan: Hearing Before the Aldermanic Committee on Streets and Squares 
(New Haven, July 14, 1958) (statement of Ernest Celotto, 88-89).  
163 Id. (statement of Ernest Celotto, 90).  
 39 
Despite the open questions, deep disagreements and fundamental misunderstandings that the 
1958 hearing, urban renewal in Wooster Square forged ahead. The plan was approved in the 
fall of 1958 and was put into motion the following year.  
 
VII. “A SCALPEL, NOT A BULLDOZER” 
 
During the planning phases of the Wooster Square renewal project, the interests of the 
Renewal Committee and the Redevelopment Agency converged around order, the promotion of 
home ownership, and the displacement of tenants, roomers, and industrial uses that, in the eyes 
of the reformers, kept the neighborhood from reaching its full potential. The eager 
participation of residents on the west side helped to spur the project along and gave credence to 
the assertion that urban renewal offered important avenues to opportunity – at least for some. 
As the plan got underway, the symbiosis between homeowners eager to make their way to the 
middle class and a City eager to produce a dramatic showcase of successful rehabilitation 
continued. Rehabilitation specialists worked closely with homeowners to bring out the full 
potential of their homes – and, by extension, the homeowners themselves. Mayor Lee and the 
Redevelopment Agency consistently brought the before-and-after story of Wooster Square to 
the national stage, solidifying the public lore of the Wooster Square project as an unmitigated 
success. 
 
Specialists hired by the Redevelopment Agency were intimately involved with every aspect of 
rehabilitation, identifying homes in need of repair, encouraging home owners to commit to 
renovations, and helping them develop plans to complete the necessary improvements. Staffers 
from the local field office would first visit a home to inform the homeowner of the services 
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available under the rehabilitation program and collect information about the family.164 After a 
visit from the housing code inspector, the inspector would give the information he had collected 
to rehabilitation specialists who would then make recommendations for improvements. The 
staff architect would study other homes on the block and the history of the building and 
suggest improvements, taking into account both what he had learned about the building and 
his understanding of the financial ability of the homeowner.165 The rehabilitation specialist and 
an architect would visit the homeowner again, giving him “a work sheet containing all housing 
code violations, methods for their correction, and all additional staff recommendations. The 
rehabilitation specialist checks out all pertinent codes and permits; makes available a list of 
contractors whose references have been thoroughly examined; works with the building 
department; checks over contracts; and in some instances, prepares rough cost estimates of the 
work involved.” 166 Rehabilitation specialists made sure that their interactions with 
homeowners were thoughtful, encouraging and collaborative. 
 
The City had several means of urging homeowners to make repairs. First, homeowners could 
only access mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration if they brought their 
properties up to the FHA’s standards, and the FHA tied these standards to New Haven’s 
housing code requirements.167 Thus, bringing one’s home up to code would open the door to 
significant federal funding that was otherwise off-limits. Second, homeowners who failed to 
comply with the requirements of the code could be fined or even imprisoned. Finally, if a 
homeowner was unwilling or unable to rehabilitate, the agency was empowered to purchase the 
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property through the use of eminent domain, which typically required homeowners to vacate 
within 90 days.168 Condemnation – euphemistically called “peaceable possession” in many of the 
Redevelopment Agency’s internal memos169 – provided a credible threat to families who were 
unwilling or unable to cooperate.  As Hommann described it, “we carry a big stick-in fact, two 
big sticks-and can afford to speak softly.”170 
 
The renewal plan also called for the conversion of rooming houses into residential 
establishments, and Court Street became the target of an early and aggressive rehabilitation 
effort. Concerned that Court Street had “degenerated into a rooming house and skid-row 
area,”171 the City targeted the block, determined to rid it of what renewal officials described as 
“squalor beyond imagination.”172 Initially built as single-family homes intended for New 
Haven’s industrial middle class,173 by the 1920s, Court Street had become a working-class 
rooming house area where immigrants were in the majority.174 By the 1950s, tenants were 
“more transient and more troubled,” and single men were the majority of occupants of the 
properties, which were mostly controlled by working-class resident owners.175 As early as 
1957, private developers had begun to acquire properties on the street, converting rooming 
houses into apartments and pricing the new units at three times the cost of the single rooms 
they displaced.176 Encouraged by these efforts, the City was able to persuade the owners of 
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roughly ten of the row houses to undergo rehabilitation. However, the bias toward detached, 
single-family homes made it difficult for owners to acquire either conventional or FHA-backed 
mortgages, and many owners could not afford to finance the costs of renovation.177 Rather than 
leave the job of rehabilitation half-done, the Redevelopment Agency decided to buy the homes 
of the remaining owners, renovate them, and then sell them on the private market. Although 
accounts favorable to urban renewal would later describe the townhouses sold to the City as  
 
belonging to owners who either “neglected to comply”180 with the housing code or “preferred to 
sell,”181 it is likely that many of the working-class homeowners, long reliant on the income 
roomers had provided, were unable to cover the costs of the rehabilitation being imposed on 
them, and were compelled to sell in the absence of other alternatives. 
 
After acquiring the townhouses, the city set to work to refashion them into stylish, 
sophisticated residences. The 15 row houses acquired by the Redevelopment Agency initially 
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Court Street Row Houses: Before. Photos taken by the Redevelopment Agency after the purchase of the 
Court Street townhouses reveal varying conditions in rooming houses.178 Though relatively modest, “Such 
accommodations were palatial in comparison with the cheap lodging houses, cubicle hotels, and flophouses 
found in large cities.”179 
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contained 124 rooming units and eight apartments182; after the properties were gutted and 
restored, each townhouse contained only two apartments,183 one of which was required to be 
owner-occupied.184 When the Redevelopment Agency put the townhomes up for sale, it 
emphasized the townhomes’ “prestige value” and promised “city living at its finest.”185 “Here is 
the fashionable town house par excellence right in New Haven,”186 promotional materials 
declared. Emphasizing the homes’ “tastefully decorated facades,” modern kitchens and 
bathrooms, and beautiful landscaping, advertisements for the project underscored that “the 
Court Street town house will appeal to the family looking for the urban feeling in house and 
community”187 – a clear statement about the Redevelopment Agency’s priority of replacing 
transient roomers with what the RA regarded as more stable and desirable tenants.188 
 
Priced at $21,000 each189 and backed with FHA mortgages arranged by the Redevelopment 
Agency,190 all of the city-rehabilitated houses were sold the first day they were made 
available.191 Families who had been displaced were given first priority in purchasing the town 
homes, and at least three families were able to return to Court Street.192 In general, “Most of 
the families who bought houses on the street, though middle-class, were not wealthy and could 
not have purchased their homes without the FHA’s help” and the rental income from the 
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second apartment each town home contained.193 Renewal represented a major boost for such 
families; thanks to the Redevelopment Agency, they were able to buy in to an extremely 
desirable area, and by the mid-1970s, they were able to sell their town homes for two to three 
times what they had paid the city.194 The continued availability of rental units at a variety of 
price points also enabled some working class families and factory workers to live on Court 
Street as tenants, even as new tenants increasingly included Yale graduate students and 
professors, architects, and politicians.195 
 
Throughout the neighborhood, many other 
homeowners also benefitted greatly from urban 
renewal, both in the form of resources made 
available through the RA and by virtue of the 
heightened quality of the surrounding properties. 
The Federal Housing Act of 1961 permitted FHA 
to insure home improvement loans of up to 
$10,000 with 20 years to pay,197 giving 
homeowners of modest means enough capital to restore their homes with ample time to pay off 
their debt. Other homeowners, largely factory workers, had been in the habit of saving to ward 
off financial disaster in the case of lay-offs. Because the years preceding the urban renewal 
initiative had been relatively prosperous, these owners had ready access to cash that could be 
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The Vision for Court Street. A promotional 
brochure imagined the rehabilitated Court Street 
townhomes as sophisticated, stylish enclaves.196 
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used for rehabilitation.198 At a 1963 gathering of 1200 members of the National Trust for 
Historic Preservation, Hommann explained that because Wooster Square was “a neighborhood 
populated by working class families … some were [initially] skeptical that these families would 
be interested in expensive restorations… But they were wrong …. ‘A barber spent $2500 on 
his home, a locksmith $7600 and a funeral director $10,000.’”199 The Redevelopment Agency 
reported that homeowners spent an average of $5000 per property on renovations, sometimes 
going well above what they had initially intended.200 Secure in the knowledge that the entire  
neighborhood was being reshaped and uplifted by the 
Redevelopment Agency and encouraged by rising demand 
for middle-income apartments,203 landlords and 
homeowners viewed home improvements as sound 
investments, and many were inspired to effect upgrades 
they had been putting off for years.204 
 
Hommann’s description of the outreach conducted by 
rehabilitation specialists reveals the class dynamics at play 
in the urban renewal project. “One rule is never to use 
high flown language,” she cautioned. “We don’t say 
something is ‘aesthetically attractive.’ We say it’s ‘high 
class,’ ‘first rate’… [and] always ask for a little more than 
                                                     
198 Hommann, Neighborhood Rehabilitation Is Working. 
199 Grant, Gerald, City Planners Stress Need of Preservation, THE WASHINGTON POST, TIMES HERALD, Oct 20, 1963. 
200 Hommann, Neighborhood Rehabilitation Is Working. 
201 New Haven Redevelopment Agency Photograph Collection, 1960. New Haven Colony Historical Society. 
202 Id. 
203 Hommann, Neighborhood Rehabilitation Is Working. 
204 Peter Gambaccini, The Decline and Rise of Wooster Square: A Landmark Success, THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 
7, 1977. 
 
Moving on up. Mayor Lee snaps a photo 
with a resident of the Wooster Square 
Project Area.201 Upon completion of a 
rehabilitation project, homeowners 
received an official certificate from the 
mayor and were later were later presented 
with a photograph from the ceremony.202  
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we expect to get. If we ask for too much, a homeowner will think we are ivory-tower people 
and ignore us…”205 Urban renewal was a chance for the educated, “high class” individuals 
working for the Redevelopment Agency to help working- and middle-class homeowners to 
improve their homes and themselves. Even if homeowners and rehabilitation specialists lacked 
a shared vocabulary around urban renewal, they shared the big idea: Wooster Square could 
once again be great, and could become the envy of every city in America.  
 
By 1965, Wooster Square had seen $17 million in new construction and $3 million in 
rehabilitation, with more on the way. In all, a total of one thousand Wooster Square buildings 
were rehabilitated.206 “The confidence, determination and dedication of the neighborhood 
residents have played a vital role in the neighborhood’s restoration,” the Redevelopment 
Agency reported.207  A moderate-income cooperative had been built, as had housing for the 
elderly; the signs of renewal were everywhere.208 “Today, some seven and a half years after 
work began, it is truly a neighborhood reborn.” 209 
 
VIII. THE DISPLACED 
 
Although working- and middle-class homeowners benefitted greatly from urban renewal, many 
poor people, black people and residents of the eastern side were not so lucky. The Relocation 
Office created to help the displacees find new places to live was overwhelmed, tasked with 
finding new homes for families as more and more of the city’s housing was razed. In addition to 
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its urban renewal workload, the Family Relocation Office (FRO) had entered into an agreement 
with the State to assist with the rehousing of people displaced by I-91210 – more than 400 
families within the boundaries of the Wooster Square project alone.211 The Relocation Office 
did its best to meet with families, assess their needs, determine eligibility for relocation 
payments, identify vacancies, and make appropriate referrals, but the office was overwhelmed. 
Alvin Mermin, longtime director of the Relocation Office, confessed that by 1962, “we were … 
hard-pressed with the State's I-91 Project as well as Wooster Square and some Church and 
Dixwell families. We had been feeling for some time the effect of years of demolition on the 
housing market.”212  
 
Part of the problem was that acquisition of properties for urban renewal and highway 
construction occurred piecemeal, making it difficult to predict exactly when housing would be 
needed. As Mermin noted, “It seemed at times like a steam roller without a driver, running at 
full speed and then mysteriously stopping, with no one person being able to either direct or 
explain its erratic activity.” 213 Matters were further complicated by the fact that the FRO 
generally intervened only after the Redevelopment Agency had acquired a building.214 
Although this policy was intended to keep the FRO’s workload at a manageable level and 
prevent people from panicking and moving out without any relocation assistance,215 conducting 
a needs assessment only after plans had been finalized made it difficult to know what type of 
housing would be needed and in what quantity, and to plan accordingly.  
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Because the timing and agenda of the family relocation office was dictated by the pace of 
property acquisition, families were pressured to leave soon after property had been acquired. 
Letters and memos internal to the Family Relocation Office suggest the tensions this approach 
created. For example, a 1963 memo discussing the temporary relocation of a 16-person family 
that lived on Jefferson Street noted “the pressure from the Redevelopment Agency to move this 
family so the parcel could be turned over to a developer. In such instances,” the author 
complained, “it would seem proper for the disposition of … land to be geared to the ability of 
the relocation office to absorb the families to be displaced. Only thus can we hope to avoid such 
cases where a family is forced to become overcrowded and to pay rent beyond [its] means.”216 
Similarly, after the Redevelopment Agency had negotiated the purchases of 2 homes on Greene 
Street and Chapel Street, a colleague of Mermin’s stressed to him that, “you should exert a 
great deal of effort to relocate the DiVeniero and Amarante families within the next 30 days … 
you have no choice but to really get to work on them.”217  
 
Widespread demolition of housing, coupled with stricter enforcement of the housing code’s 
quality controls and occupancy limits, greatly reduced the City’s stock of low-income rental 
units, and the construction of new housing did not keep up with the needs of the displacees. 
Although New Haven implemented several innovative programs to increase low-income 
housing – for instance, New Haven was the first city in America to provide low-rent housing 
for large families in privately owned leased units, and the first to develop cooperative housing 
(including in Wooster Square) for both low and moderate-income families under Section 
                                                     
216 Unnamed document dated December 10, 1963. Mermin Papers - Studies - Large Family Demonstration Project 
- Box V, Folder E. New Haven Colony Historical Society. 
217Letter from Chuck Shannon to Al Mermin, July 9, 1965. New Haven Redevelopment Agency Records, Box 676, 
Folder R-1 Residential Relocation Correspondence, 1957-197_.  
 49 
221(d)(3) of the Housing Act218 – there were major barriers to the creation of low-income 
housing in the city. Even though many proponents of urban renewal averred concern for the 
poor, opposition to plans for low-income housing was widespread and persistent, “whether a 
low-income, middle-income, or an upper-income area; whether it’s a racially mixed, 
predominantly black, or predominantly white neighborhood.”219 Neighborhood resistance and 
funding constraints meant that housing construction consistently fell below the Redevelopment 
Agency’s optimistic projections, and overall the creation of low-income housing was “grossly 
inadequate … At least 7,850 housing units were demolished” from 1956-72 while “2,214 new 
units were opened, resulting in a net loss of 5,636 units for low- and moderate-income 
households.”220 By 1966, less than one percent of the 1615 housing units built under urban 
renewal had been created for low-income families; at the same time, the waiting list for public 
housing was roughly fifteen hundred families.221 In 1965, the Redevelopment Agency 
minimized the problem, stating that “homes [of the displaced] were unlivable slums, and there 
never was any question of there being enough good homes at the right price elsewhere in New 
Haven, or of the ability of the expert Relocation Office to handle the job.”222 Unfortunately for 
those pushed out, the reality was much more grim than this optimistic description suggests. 
The situation was particularly grim for people displaced in the earlier part of the urban renewal 
period, including many of those in Wooster Square. The “timing of construction meant that 
people uprooted by the early renewal projects were only accidentally beneficiaries of new 
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lower-income housing”223 – the Relocation Office struggled to place people displaced in the late 
fifties and early sixties because “up until 1962 there were no new facilities for low-income 
families at all, only promises and reassurances that the existing supply was adequate.”224 
 
Efforts to place families in private rental units were limited to a small handful of 
neighborhoods; many were unaffordable and others were future project areas, which were off-
limits to official relocations since any new arrivals might have to be moved again.225 As a result, 
the Relocation Office attempted to integrate these families into a small handful of ‘middle 
ground’ areas226 – Newhallville, Dwight, Fair Haven and the Hill. Many landlords were 
prejudiced against and unwilling to accept black tenants; “still others needed persuasion to 
accept any family from us – white or nonwhite – because of their impression that we dealt only 
with ‘slum families.’”227 Large families that exceeded the allowable size for public housing were 
particularly difficult to place. Although relocation officials did what they could to convince 
private landlords to accept displacees, the FRO had few tools at its disposal besides persuasion. 
 
Urban renewal also drove up rents citywide, making it difficult for displacees to find 
appropriate housing elsewhere. The dramatic reduction in the number of low-income housing 
units, the large and ever-greater number of displaced people and the gentrification underway in 
renewal areas like Wooster Square created a landlord’s market where landlords could demand 
higher prices than ever before.228 Wooster Square’s Court Street area demonstrates this trend. 
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Pre-renewal, 1-bedroom apartments in the city-rehabilitated townhouses had rented for $25-
$50. After rehabilitation, these same units rented for $75-$90,229 and the lowest-cost rooms had 
disappeared altogether. It is unlikely that many of those displaced were able to return.  
A 1964 report on the housing of families displaced by urban renewal noted that virtually every 
relocation study from the 1930s onward reported higher rents resulting from a reduced supply 
and increased demand for housing; the burdens of these increases fell heavily on the poorest 
people, whose rent-to-income ratios increased significantly.230 Within Connecticut, 1963 report 
on relocation in New Haven, Hartford and several other cities found that urban renewal tended 
to cause minorities “to move to more segregated accommodations and … pay higher rents than 
if they had not been forced to relocate.”231  
 
Between 1958 and 1974, roughly 2,155 of 3,069 of Wooster Square’s housing units (roughly 
seventy percent) were demolished and many more were vacated for renovations, “rarely to be 
occupied by their original inhabitants.”232 2,710 households were relocated,233 comprising an 
estimated 7,913 people.234 This is more people than were displaced from any other renewal 
area, and more than twice the number of people displaced from Dixwell, the Hill, Oak Street, 
and other neighborhoods traditionally thought of as the “failures” of the urban renewal 
period.235 Striking as these figures are, they almost certainly understate the actual displacement 
caused by urban renewal efforts and highway construction in the area. Redevelopment Agency 
records suggest that  
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State Highway Department records may have lost cases of households displaced 
by road construction, particularly in the rights of way for Oak Street and I-91. 
Even more important may be the exclusion from official records of households 
who moved prior to eviction in anticipation of renewal or in response to landlord 
divestment and communal disintegration exacerbated by urban renewal. Also 
uncounted are households within project areas (which are very large in New 
Haven) but not in target sites. Depending on which of these additional 
categories of households are defined as ‘displaced’ by urban renewal, the final 
figure for displacement may easily be 50 to 100 percent greater than that for 
relocation.236 
 
The record confirms that in the Court Street area, many roomers left on their own initiative 
after hearing news of impending acquisition by the city. “Thus by the time a building became 
the property of the Redevelopment Agency, the rooms were often vacant … [and] it is not 
known where the majority found subsequent accommodations.”237 In all likelihood, displacees 
moved to other “slum” areas in the city, or became homeless.238 Similar patterns unfolded 
throughout the Wooster Square project area. If one takes as true Mermin’s estimate that a total 
of 1466 Wooster Square families were officially “relocated,”239 it is likely that half or more of 
the families displaced from the area received no help with relocation. Such a pattern would be 
consistent with studies of displacement in Boston, Providence, New York and Chicago, which 
suggested that anywhere from fifty to as little as six percent of families found their new homes 
with the assistance of relocation officials.240 Although the Relocation Office was aware that 
families and individuals relocated themselves without aid and officials endeavored to trace and 
provide help to those who had left,241 it is almost certain that many, if not most such people 
were “lost” to the record.  
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The displacement caused by the I-91 and by the urban renewal initiative had racially disparate 
impacts. Although over half of those displaced were white, nonwhite families constituted a 
disproportionate share of those displaced by urban renewal and “any one family of color had a 
far greater chance of being relocated than any single white family.”242 Families of color were 
placed in public housing over three times as often as white families. In contrast, whites made 
more than three times the number of in-town home purchases as non-whites, in large part 
because many whites owned homes condemned under urban renewal and received market-rate 
compensation when the city acquired their properties.243  
 
To the extent that the drive for slum clearance was motivated by the desire to see to it that “a 
growing black neighborhood was surgically removed from the downtown area,”244 it largely 
succeeded. Between 1960 and 1967, the black population in Wooster Square south of Grand 
Avenue245 declined by 79%, despite a citywide increase of 40% in this same period.246 The black 
population in Census Tract 21, the northern area that contained Farnam Courts, fell by 24% 
from 1960-1967.247 However, because a significant number of black people had migrated to this 
area by the late 1950s and in-migration continued during the 1960s, the area was 40% black by 
1967.248 Thus, urban renewal had the effect of reducing the black population in the residential 
area surrounding Wooster Square Park, while increasing segregation between that enclave and 
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the area north of Grand Avenue. In absolute numbers, though, poor and working-class white 
families were the big losers in Wooster Square. More than two thirds of the total population of 
the area disappeared,249 and over half of those displaced were white. From 1950 to 1970, the 
white population in Wooster Square declined by over 13,000.250  
 
By the mid-1970s, rents had skyrocketed to over $400 a month and “Some old timers in 
Wooster Square … [were] astonished at the new high class atmosphere their efforts helped 
produce … New owners and tenants … tend to be attorneys, architects, physicians, and other 
professional people.”251 This change should have come as no surprise to the homeowners who 
had eagerly collaborated with the Redevelopment Agency throughout the urban renewal 
project in the interest of their own and the neighborhood’s advancement. The uplift they had 
sought would not have been possible without the displacement of scores of poor people and 
their replacement with higher-class neighbors whose arrival was both foreseeable and, to many, 
expressly desired. 
 
IX. THE IMAGE OF WOOSTER SQUARE 
"That is what urban renewal should be all about. People having fun in attractive 
surroundings. Can you imagine what New York would be like with a hundred Wooster 
Squares?"252 
 
Given the enormous number of people displaced by the Wooster Square project, it is striking 
that many accounts continued to lavish unqualified praise on the project, even after urban 
renewal as a whole had become more widely criticized. This is in part the result of a concerted 
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effort on behalf of Mayor Lee’s administration portray Wooster Square as a success. Even 
before the project launched, the Lee administration with concerned about promoting the public 
image of Wooster Square, requesting a model of what lay ahead for Wooster Square “so that 
coming into 1959 we will be able to have it on TV and use it for display purposes …”253 
Correspondence between Lee and Logue reveals that Lee regarded the project as critical to his 
political ambitions. “Where are we on Wooster Square?” he impatiently asked in early 1958. 
“This is getting very important to me for a lot of reasons, especially in connection with the 
Senate.”254 Sources suggest that the Redevelopment Agency even went so far as to conduct 
outreach to media outlets that questioned the necessity of the project. In one private letter 
addressed to Lee, a Redevelopment Agency official wrote: 
 
I had a private talk with Gerry Harrington on Tuesday afternoon and I have his 
assurance that there will be no more stories like the interview-type article, with 
pictures, which appeared in the Tuesday Courier … The comments that Hall received 
from the interviewees did not, Gerry agrees, reflect the accurate opinion of Wooster 
Square area residents toward renewal. Certainly, a mother pushing a baby carriage who 
never comes into contact with seedy characters in the area, and a reflective old man of 
70 years who otherwise has been sheltered from this group, are no spokesmen for the 
area.255 
 
Although they were residents speaking to their own experiences of the area, those who felt that 
the neighborhood was fine as it was were, in the Redevelopment Agency’s view, per se 
unrepresentative of the “accurate opinion of Wooster Square residents.” That the contact at the 
Courier seems to have agreed not to publish further stories questioning the wisdom of the 
project in the weeks before its final approval is troubling. 
 
Once the rehabilitation project began, the Redevelopment Agency aggressively sold the plan to 
national news outlets, many of which seemed captivated by the dramatic rags-to-riches stories 
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the Wooster Square renewal plan presented. “New Haven Sets An Example,” The Wall Street 
Journal declared in 1962, praising the city’s innovative rehabilitation of Court Street and its use 
of the demonstration project to encourage private rehabilitation. The article emphasized how 
working-class residents had benefitted from the project: “Says … a retired factory worker who  
spent $5000 to redecorate and re-roof his six-family building near Wooster Square: ‘It was the 
best money I ever spent.’”256 That same year, a series 
of articles in the Journal of Housing  
extensively described the efforts in Wooster Square, 
lending the project visibility among housing and 
redevelopment officials across the nation and serving 
as a how-to guide for cities that might wish to follow 
in New Haven’s footsteps. One article boldly 
proclaimed that “Neighborhood Rehabilitation is 
Working in Six Neighborhoods in New Haven – Here’s How.”257 In the article, Hommann 
emphasized the close working relationship between rehabilitation specialists and homeowners, 
noting that the former were so deeply involved that they effectively served as “confidential 
counselors to the homeowner as long as they are needed.”258 The article also emphasized the 
role of Ted De Lauro, a project staffer and “a man who grew up in the neighborhood and has 
been a neighborhood leader all his adult life,”259 and noted that Italian staff in the field office 
facilitated communication with elderly Italian residents and even helped them apply for 
citizenship. Ignoring all those who were displaced, Hommann focused on the enthusiasm of 
local homeowners and the leading role the Wooster Square Renewal Committee had played in 
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A prestige address. “Ten years ago Court 
Street in New Haven was a skid row. Now it is a 
prestige address.” The New York Times, 1965. 
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spearheading the project. In Hommann’s narrative, residents of Wooster Square were active 
agents in the remaking of their neighborhood, and numerous photographs depicted the striking 
and beautiful results. 
 
In its 1965 annual report, the Redevelopment Agency proudly proclaimed that Wooster Square 
“had been the subject of numerous magazine and newspaper articles, an entire book, and 
occupied much of a 30-minute NBC television show on the New Haven Renewal program. The 
startling success of the once-blighted neighborhood has sparked enthusiasm in other renewal 
areas, and serves as a 
model” for other renewal 
project areas.262 “Before 
and after” pictures of 
homes in Wooster Square 
regularly appeared in the 
media, and Mayor Lee 
presented photos of the 
area when he testified 
before the Senate 
Banking and Currency 
Committee.263  
Remarking on the 
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numerous tours of Wooster Square that took place during this period, one former resident 
would later note with bitterness that, “Wooster Square was kept sort of as the Hollywood stage 
setting when guests would come in to view [Lee’s] great successes…”264  
 
A 1965 book on anti-poverty efforts in New Haven referenced “the widely-acclaimed 
rehabilitation of an old, deteriorating, largely Italian residential and light industrial 
neighborhood."265 The same year, The New York Times described the transformation of Court 
Street from a skid row to a “prestige address,”266 including a photo of a young white family in 
front of a row of restored townhouses to illustrate the point. 
 
The Wooster Square project was also lauded in numerous books published by Redevelopment 
Agency officials, associates of Mayor Lee’s, and others who had been intimately involved in 
urban renewal, helping to cement its image as a smashing success. Hommann’s Wooster Square 
Design was the first and most comprehensive such account; the book highlighted resident 
participation in the planning and implementation of the renewal project, and the overwhelming 
majority of the images in the book were architectural renderings and before-and-after photos of 
rehabilitated homes. Most of the people depicted in Hommann’s text were proud homeowners; 
a closing chapter emphasized how the neighborhood had been enriched by Community 
Progress, Inc. and the lively activities at the Conte School.267 Again, the people displaced by the 
project were largely invisible in Hommann’s narrative. In 1966, a book about urban renewal 
written by a Democratic Alderman lovingly described how, “Wooster Square had been 
transformed. When I first came to the city the ‘Wooster Street gang’ was spoken of with 
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uneasiness… Now Wooster Square had become one of the nation’s showplaces of rehabilitation 
and renewal.”268  
 
By 1967, Allan Talbot’s Mayor’s Game – the inside view of a city employee who had worked in 
the Lee administration from 1960-1965269 – was somewhat more critical in its assessment of 
urban renewal in Wooster Square, but still largely positive. Indeed, Talbot’s criticisms at times 
read like reluctant revelations, which he is quick to counter with stubbornly optimistic 
conclusions. For example, while Talbot is frank about the motivations of some Wooster Square 
residents to get rid of black people,270 he ultimately praises them for their tolerance (“Italians of 
Wooster Square can and do take pride in the peaceful and often generous way they have 
accepted integration”).271 Though Talbot acknowledges that “no one is completely sure what 
happened to those who used to live in the Court Street rooming houses,” “some owners were 
too poor to rehabilitate their homes,” and I-91 “made an island out of a public housing project 
which used to be part of the neighborhood,” he nevertheless concludes that, “the successes of 
Wooster Square are more numerous.”272 Powledge’s Model City also critiques urban renewal for 
emphasizing physical renewal more than human renewal or citizen participation, yet Wooster 
Square escapes his rebuke. Instead, he contrasts the successes in Wooster Square to failures 
elsewhere, writing that, “They lovingly restored Wooster Square, and selfishly ignored the 
Hill.”273 He asserts that “few [merchants] were forced to leave the neighborhood by the 
project”274 – even though an estimated 450 businesses275 were displaced.  
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Numerous accounts in books and the media focused heavily on the architecture in Wooster 
Square, often leaving unsaid or downplaying the effect urban renewal had had on the area’s 
residents. While rehabilitation and renewal were underway, Wooster Square became “a mecca 
for planners and architects throughout the country.”276 Elizabeth Mills Brown, a noted 
preservationist and urban historian, wrote a volume on Wooster Square in behalf of the New 
Haven Preservation Trust in 1969, cataloging the area’s attractive Victorian homes and 
underscoring the neighborhood’s architectural significance.277 That same year, a profile in The 
Hartford Courant described several townhomes purchased by architects from the New Haven 
Redevelopment Agency and renovated by their owners to fit their idiosyncratic tastes; the 
article offered readers an inside peek into the townhomes’ creative uses and “free, expansive 
living spaces.”278 By 1970, Wooster Square became New Haven’s first local historic district, and 
in 1971, it was placed on the National Register of Historic Places.279 These developments 
helped strengthen the public image of Wooster Square as being synonymous with its beautiful 
architecture. Several years later, the New York Times reported that “the highway was good 
news for the beleaguered neighborhood” because “industrial blight and the spread of tenements 
had at one time threatened to engulf and strangle Wooster Square…”280 Again focusing on 
buildings rather than people, the article noted that “Wooster Square’s houses were in severe 
disrepair” and that the “final design of Interstate 91 helped realize” the neighborhood’s 
potential for historic preservation.281 All of these narratives were variations on the theme that 
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what was important about Wooster Square was ultimately not the people who once lived there, 
but the buildings that had been great, had fallen from glory and were saved just in time.  
 
Many articles on Wooster Square dramatized the neighborhood’s decline in the years before 
urban renewal, the better to tell the story of its impressive ascent in the 1950s and 1960s. For 
example, a 1974 Courant piece that urged Hartford to look to New Haven as an example of the 
type of restoration that was possible began by explaining how homes had been  
 
overcrowded and neglected. Cheap storefronts grew and stucco peeled… as front 
porches and columns rotted … the neighborhood had degenerated to a slum, ready for 
destruction. Then wonderful things happened. Children of Italians who had moved 
away moved back to the old neighborhood. Professors and politicians and architects 
took a closer look at the old houses. Everybody decided to work to rebuild the 
neighborhood, together.282 
 
Of course, the “everybody” who worked together did not include the two thirds of the 
population that had been displaced, and nor were those people in a position to enjoy the idyllic 
scene the author described. Although the piece acknowledges criticism of urban renewal, it 
deflects such critique by positioning Wooster Square itself as the entity worth saving: “Even 
the Redevelopment Agency, sometimes accused of helping to break down the square’s spirit, 
can be credited with helping it after all.” 283 The harm to the former residents whose spirits may 
have been broken is downplayed in view of the clear boon to “the square’s spirit.” In a similar 
vein, The Wall Street Journal personified Wooster Square in a 1985 article describing its path to 
glory, saying the “slum” neighborhood “rose from its decay so that the square has become a 
national model of renewal, a haven of graceful old houses surrounded by a graceful old 
square.”284 The neighborhood continued to serve as a model of an urban renewal project that 
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“worked” in a 1997 piece in The Hartford Courant, which marveled that, “Redevelopment of New 
Haven's Wooster Square neighborhood, epicenter of the Northeast pizza zone, was so artfully 
done that most people don't know it was redeveloped.”285  
 
X. REMEMBERING WOOSTER SQUARE 
 
Popular accounts of Wooster Square reflect a simple truth: history is written by the victors. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, those who were displaced by I-91 and by urban renewal were 
dispersed to other neighborhoods, making it difficult to keep track of them and what their 
experiences had been. Once people began to leave Wooster Square, they were integrated into 
and became a part of the stories of the new neighborhoods they came to call home, and those 
who remained in Wooster Square were left to tell its tale. Lacking strength in numbers or 
community institutions through which to unite, many of those who moved to the suburbs likely 
were absorbed into the heterogeneous landscapes of their new communities. Within New 
Haven, many black families displaced from Wooster Square moved to the Hill, which would, by 
the late 1960s, become a major site of contest in the black civil rights movement. The struggle 
in the Hill would not have unfolded as it did had it not been for the influx of displacees from 
Wooster Square and other urban renewal neighborhoods. At the same time, Wooster Square 
itself had changed dramatically by the time of the 1967 riots, and the failure of many popular 
accounts to draw the connections between Wooster Square and subsequent civil rights 
struggles is understandable. The frequent inattention to the stories of those displaced from 
Wooster Square may also stem from the fact that the neighborhood has retained its Italian 
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“flavor,” particularly in the form of its world-famous pizzerias286 and the continued tradition of 
certain neighborhood festivals that provide occasion for members of the greater New Haven 
Italian community to once more descend upon the square.  
 
While the strength of the Italian community in the area today is often exaggerated and pales in 
comparison with what it once was, many Italians displaced by urban renewal maintain close ties 
to their old neighborhood. This fact has made it possible for historians to connect with many of 
those who were displaced in the 1950s and 1960s and to hear their version of the history of 
Wooster Square. It is by most accounts a story of heartbreak. Anthony Riccio’s 2006 collection 
on Italian Americans in New Haven287 includes the voices of many residents with fond 
memories of their lives in the “slums.” “Everybody just seemed to be a lot happier, that’s 
basically what it was. You knew your next door neighbor and the one over there and the one 
over there and everybody knew you,” said one. “Today you’re lucky if you know your next door 
neighbor, you’re lucky if they talk to you.”288 Another man mourned the loss of close familial 
connections he had had in Wooster Square: “We used to live in the same building, the same 
tenement building. My sisters got married and they lived downstairs. My aunt lived 
downstairs. My cousins lived downstairs … And I saw them every day. Now I don’t see them 
for months at a time because they broke up that neighborhood.” 289 Many speakers contrasted 
the tight-knit community they had had in Wooster Square with the feelings of estrangement 
they experienced in their new neighborhoods: “everybody was happy. Because they had 
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nothing. Today everybody’s rich. And they think they’re somebody, you know … We used to 
visit one another. Just talk, you know… Today, I lived here for about thirty years, I don’t know 
my neighbors…”290 The statements of these former residents echo those captured by Marc 
Fried in his essay “Grieving for a Lost Home,” based on interviews with people forced to 
relocate from Boston’s West End. Fried found that the psychological harms inflicted by forced 
displacement went far beyond the initial disruption caused by the move itself. Instead, “for the 
majority it seems quite precise to speak of their reactions as expressions of grief,” and feelings of 
loss persisted for years. “In response to a series of questions concerning the feelings of sadness 
and depression which people experienced after moving, many replies were unambiguous: ‘I felt 
as though I had lost everything,’ ‘I felt like my heart was taken out of me’…, ‘I lost all the 
friends I knew’…”291 
 
Poor though it was, Wooster Square provided networks of social support displacees were hard-
pressed to find elsewhere. An early theorist of slums distinguished “slums of despair” from 
“slums of hope” like Wooster Square: 
 
The slums of ‘hope’ … are the home of the stranger, the in-migrant, the recent 
arrival. These strangers have been attracted to the city by the social or economic 
opportunities the city offers… The strangers come to the city seeking 
‘improvement’ but, if they lack the language abilities, educational attainments 
and other necessary social and economic resources, they may find escalation 
difficult … They will learn the language [in the slums]. They will become 
acclimated and they will acquire the cultural resources necessary [to 
succeed].292  
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In Wooster Square, Italians and Italian Americans had deep networks of support on which to 
draw even when times were difficult. Although urban renewal did represent an important rung 
on the ladder of opportunity for the working- and middle-class homeowners who were able to 
reap its rewards, displacement harmed many others, and “by forcing people to rebuild their 
lives separately amid strangers … slum clearance [came] at a serious psychological as well as 
financial cost to its supposed beneficiaries.”293  
 
Many former residents of Wooster Square seem convinced that urban renewal and highway 
construction through the heart of the neighborhood were deliberate political maneuvers 
designed to break up what had been a Republican stronghold. “From the standpoint of the 
Italians … it had the deliberate effect of driving many Italians out of the city,” said one former 
resident. “There’s no proof; no one is going to say it …”294 Another offered, “He could not 
break this ward, simply could not take this ward. Coincidental? Of course anybody can make 
the argument. Was it coincidental that you had the conjunction of I-95 and I-91 right in this 
ward wiping everything out? We don’t think it was coincidental…”295 “If you’re looking to get 
rid of opposition… I’m not saying that’s what happened but that’s the rumor,”296 said a third. 
Historian Douglas Rae has questioned the idea that Lee deliberately targeted opposition wards 
for highways and urban renewal projects, noting that, “Lee’s own 17th Ward lost more 
population than any other in the city during his administration.”297 But an internal memo 
reveals that as early as 1958, Lee had requested and received an analysis of the likely effect of 
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the Wooster Square Project on the voting patterns in wards Ten, Eleven and Twelve,298 
suggesting that securing victory in these neighborhoods was part of his thought process. 
Whether or not one believes that political maneuvering accounted for a great part of Lee’s 
motivations, his record speaks for itself. By 1959, Italian voters “split about evenly between Lee 
and his Republican opponent, James Valenti,”299 and in the 1965 election, Lee carried the vote 
in Wooster Square for the first time ever,300 an outcome likely produced by the homeowners he 
had co-opted and the detractors he had displaced.  
 
In many cases, residents of Wooster Square felt that the homes destroyed during urban 
renewal were not the unlivable hovels the Redevelopment Agency made them out to be. “They 
call them tenement houses,” recalled one resident. “But one thing I know – that those Italians 
kept those co-called tenement houses spanking clean. You could have eaten off those floors in 
the hallways …”301 Another woman recalled that, “those houses were as clean as a whistle. The 
ladies would even scrub the steps going outdoors!’” 302 As Riccio explains, “What New Haven’s 
housing experts and city planners considered substandard housing at the time of urban renewal 
during the 1950s – poor plumbing facilities, worn finishes on exteriors and unfinished cellars – 
was an accepted way of life for many of New Haven’s Italians who kept their modest homes and 
cold water apartments meticulously clean.” 303  
 
Urban renewal in Wooster Square seemed designed to help residents reach what reformers 
perceived as the American dream – stable, single-family, quasi-suburban homes in a “high class” 
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area. But the reformers seemed blind to the fact that many Italian Americans in the area had 
already achieved their own versions of the American dream, and the widespread displacement 
and use of eminent domain caused many people to question the country they had grown to love. 
As one displaced resident explained, 
 
All their lives, they wanted to buy a house. That was their American dream. You 
come to America, you get a job, you own your own house and have a garden in 
back, a vegetable garden and all that and that was their dream. They finally got 
it, you know … And they thought they were settled. And then wham!304 
 
 
Another former resident recalled his mother’s disbelief when he attempted to explain eminent 
domain to her. “‘Che gazz e cheste eminent domain.’ What the hell is this eminent domain? She 
said [in Italian] ‘What are they saying? It’s my house. I paid for it. What do you mean 
somebody can come and take it? This is America.’”305 A third critic recounted, “when you come 
in and say, Well listen now you have to move whether you like it or not, you have to move. 
That changes your whole perspective … This is a free country? It’s not a free country.”306 For 
many in the path of “progress,” urban renewal did not represent a fulfillment of the American 




Determining whether the rehabilitation and renovation of Wooster Square was a “success” is 
very much a question of perspective. On the one hand, the process of determining the 
placement of I-91 and of planning for urban renewal provided important opportunities for 
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many residents, particularly homeowners on the west side, to engage in the political process; 
these residents were able to have a major influence on the projects that would come to reshape 
their neighborhood. Many homeowners – including middle- and working-class people who had 
long been shut out from private mortgages – were able to gain access to valuable resources and 
(as they saw it) improve their quality of life. In these ways, urban renewal in Wooster Square 
was importantly different than urban renewal as it unfolded elsewhere in New Haven and in 
other cities where entire neighborhoods were simply razed. To the extent that it encouraged 
citizen participation and opened opportunities for those who had previously been disfranchised, 
Wooster Square is a promising model for other communities that believe that a neighborhood’s 
future should be determined to a great degree by all those who live there. In addition, from an 
aesthetic standpoint, few would argue with Wooster Square’s success. Many of its fine homes 
remain in the fine state they achieved during the urban renewal period, where neighborhoods 
that relied on more aggressive clearance strategies have seen the products of the urban renewal 
period come and go or, in some cases, linger on in a state of increasing decay. 
 
But these successes are only part of the story. Thousands were left out of the process, degraded 
as “slum dwellers,” and pushed out, either to other “slums” or to “nicer” neighborhoods they 
would never have chosen for themselves. To many Italian Americans, “What came after “the 
highway” was irrelevant or a negative contribution to their tale of ‘community lost’ … [in 
terms of] their places of residence and their everyday interactions.”307 Many others who were 
pushed out – in particular the growing black community in the area – were yet more 
disfranchised and are to a great degree lost in the historical record of Wooster Square, even in 
accounts that attempt to grapple with the human costs of urban renewal. 
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Ultimately, people need not, and will not, agree about what and who is most important in a 
process of community development. Even with a full understanding the toll Wooster Square’s 
redevelopment had on those whose lives it disrupted, there are those who would say it was 
worth the price. Such disagreements are inevitable, and it is reasonable to question what weight 
should be given to the preferences of residents who stand to be harmed by redevelopment when 
many complex and pressing issues are at stake. But it is impossible for communities facing 
these difficult and important conversations to learn from the past when history has been 
rewritten to exclude those who stood in opposition.  
 
The deliberate maneuvers of the Lee administration, the extent to which the press seems to 
have been enthralled by Wooster Square as a Cinderella story, and the tendency to forget 
people who are no longer around have all served to reshape the story of Wooster Square to an 
easy narrative of neighborhood uplift. Today, the website of the New Haven Preservation 
Trust describes how clearance and neighborhood destruction were averted by “a fortunate 
series of circumstances” and “a community-wide conviction that the neighborhood was worth 
saving.”308 Newer arrivals to the community “collectively remember[] the pre-regeneration 
neighborhood as a place where ‘nobody’ wanted to stay. The renewal and historical 
preservation in tandem had brought about a positive change, architecturally and for ‘the 
community.’ It had become a better place where ‘everybody’ was professional, understood the 
value of historical architecture and ‘authenticity’… ‘an island’ surrounded by ‘less decent 
places.’” 309 In the view of these gentrifiers, the “authentic” character of the neighborhood had 
been established by industrial elites, and urban renewal “brought back its ‘original’ beauty and 
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charm. The idea of authenticity as the neighborhood having one ‘true’ character to be 
reinstalled erased events in between…”310 
 
New Haven and other cities that hope to effect redevelopment without repeating the mistakes 
of the urban renewal period must resist the act of forgetting around Wooster Square. Looking 
to urban renewal as a cautionary tale for modern-day urban developments, a 2000 article in 
Mother Jones, an extremely progressive publication, upheld Wooster Square as the sole success 
of urban renewal in New Haven. Making no mention of the thousands displaced, the article 
described how “residents fought the highway plan and were brought in by Lee to help plan a 
renewal effort … Many of the neighborhood's buildings were kept intact, and so was much of 
the community. The result, today, is a graceful and lively mixed-income neighborhood still 
filled with families, churches, social clubs, and restaurants.”311 Though accurate, this 
description is far from complete, and the claim that “much of the community” remained when 
some 13,000 people were displaced is specious. Similarly, a 2012 article on the plan to revive 
the Oak Street area through the construction of the Downtown Crossing noted that, “It will be 
difficult to capture the charm of neighborhoods such as Wooster Square … which escaped the 
punishing effects of urban renewal.”312 Even as the article addressed a plan to right the wrongs 
of urban renewal, it perpetuated a major mistake of the period: taking architectural success as 
evidence that urban renewal had not taken a huge toll on people. These two articles urge 
modern-day reformers look to Wooster Square as a how-to guide for responsible development. 
We should instead regard it for what it was: a testament to the incredible difficulties associated 
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with any plan that stands to fundamentally remake a neighborhood, and a cautionary tale about 
how difficult it is to do what “the community” wants when that community is home to many 
American dreams that cannot easily coexist. 
